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Abstract
The aim of my thesis is to investigate the importance of access to information for
individuals in developing countries. In the first chapter, I describe an important
channel through which improved access to market information could increase the
prices that producers receive from middlemen. I develop a theoretical model
of trade between a farmer and a middleman which allows for the existence of
different types of middlemen and I provide an empirical test of the theory from
an original framed field experiment carried out with farmers and middlemen in
India. In chapter 2, I investigate the relationship between the decision to produce
high-quality goods and two important characteristics of the product: the degree
of observability of quality and the level of intermediation in the supply chain. I
present a model which demonstrates that if quality is not perfectly observable,
there will be a range of values of the price difference between high-quality and
low-quality goods for which production of high-quality goods will occur with
vertical integration but will not occur if the stages of production are carried out
by separate agents. This chapter also presents some case studies of supply chains
for various products in a number of developing countries that have characteristics
which are consistent with the predictions of the model. In the final chapter, I
try to understand how access to information could be improved for individuals in
developing countries. I investigate the relationship between rates of mobile phone
and Internet use and a number of geographic, institutional and economic variables
in a sample of 164 countries from 1990 to 2009. The aim of this chapter is to
identify the main characteristics of countries that have had success in adopting
these new technologies in order to gain some insight into the barriers which may
be faced by those countries that have been less successful.
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Introduction
In this thesis, I aim to address a number of questions relating to the importance
of access to information for individuals in developing countries. The first two
chapters describe situations where producers do not have access to perfect infor-
mation regarding price or quality and investigate what effect this has on prices
received and production decisions. The final chapter attempts to understand how
access to information could be improved for individuals in developing countries.
In chapter 1, I investigate an important channel through which improved ac-
cess to market information could increase the prices that producers receive from
middlemen. I develop a theoretical model of trade between a farmer and a mid-
dleman which allows for the existence of different types of middlemen. The source
of heterogeneity is attitudes towards fairness. I provide an empirical test of the
theory from an original framed field experiment carried out with farmers and
middlemen in India. The model predicts that there will be a non-monotonic re-
lationship between the benefit of information and the cost of switching to a new
middleman. The results of the experiment support the predictions of the model
and demonstrate that actual middlemen differ in their attitudes towards fairness,
middlemen make higher offers when the farmer is informed, and the benefit of
information to the farmer varies with the cost of switching.
In chapter 2, I present a model of a supply chain for a good involving two stages
of production. Effort must be exerted at both stages if a high-quality good is to
be produced. Effort is not observable and the quality of the good is not perfectly
observable. The model predicts that there will be a range of values of the price
difference between high-quality and low-quality goods for which production of
high-quality goods will occur with vertical integration but will not occur if the
tasks are carried out by separate agents. The range of price values for which
this occurs will be decreasing as the level of observability of quality increases and
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will disappear as quality becomes perfectly observable. I also present some case
studies of supply chains for various products in a number of developing countries
that have characteristics which are consistent with the predictions of the model.
In the chapter 3, I use a logistic model of technology diffusion to investigate
the relationship between rates of mobile phone and Internet use and a number
of geographic, institutional and economic variables, in a sample of 164 countries
from 1990 to 2009. The aim of this chapter is to identify the main characteristics
of countries that have had success in adopting these new technologies in order to
gain some insight into the barriers which may be faced by those countries that
have been less successful.
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Chapter 1
Middlemen, Bargaining and Price Information: Is
Knowledge Power?
1.1 Introduction
The majority of the poor in developing countries depend on agriculture for their
livelihoods. Moreover, high and volatile food prices can have severe negative
consequences for the welfare of the poor. Improving the efficiency of agricultural
markets is therefore a priority. Agricultural supply chains are often dominated by
middlemen with substantial market power. Their high margins distort the market
by driving a wedge between the price paid to farmers and by final consumers. One
source of market power lies in the fact that middlemen are better informed about
market conditions, especially the prices further down the supply chain. This
raises the possibility that better access to market information can increase the
prices that farmers receive from middlemen, thereby increasing their income and
helping them to make better production decisions.
A number of recent empirical papers have investigated the effects of better
market information on producer prices, although results are mixed. However,
few of these studies are able to model explicitly how a farmer can use price
information when bargaining with a middleman. It is normally assumed that
the farmer receives a higher price when he is informed because he is risk averse.
However, since the variability of the price that he receives will also be higher, it
is not clear that the farmer will be better off when he is informed. In this paper,
I develop a theoretical model to demonstrate how market information can lead to
an increase in the price that a farmer receives from middlemen through a different
10
channel. The approach allows for the presence of different types of middlemen,
and for farmers to switch to a different buyer between periods. The paper provides
an empirical test of the theory from an original framed field experiment carried
out with actual farmers and middlemen in Gujarat, India.1
In the basic two-period model, a farmer and a middleman trade with one an-
other. The middleman is informed about the market price for the good that they
are trading while the farmer knows only the distribution of prices. The farmer
has an outside option to go to the market himself but faces high transport costs.
He may encounter one of two types of middlemen. The ‘good’ type cares about
fairness and splits the gains from trade equally with the farmer. The ‘bad’ type
behaves strategically and aims to maximize the sum of his gains from the two
periods. The field experiment reported on here is mapped closely on to the set-up
of the model. It is used to investigate whether the posited heterogeneity among
middlemen is observed in reality. Also, by exogenously varying the cost of switch-
ing to a different middleman it is possible to test the prediction that the benefit
of information varies with the degree of competition between middlemen.
There are a number of different ways to model heterogeneity among middle-
men, e.g. different transport costs, different outside options, and these will result
in similar predictions to those of the model presented here. In this paper, I de-
cided to model the different types as having different attitudes to fairness, as this
seems to be something that is true in reality and the framed field experiment
gives us an opportunity to investigate its importance. Interviews with farmers
and information providers in India suggest that exploitation by dishonest mid-
dlemen is an important concern for farmers and that information can be used to
protect against this. The idea that the honesty or integrity of the middleman
can be hidden when the farmer is uninformed about prices has been alluded to
by previous authors but until now has not been explicitly addressed.2
The model yields some intuitive predictions. The existence of different types
of middlemen creates a new role for price information stressing selection as well
as incentives. It is easier for the bad middleman to disguise his type if the farmer
1I believe that this experiment qualifies as a framed field experiment as described by Harrison
and List (2004) as the participants bring relevant information with them from their daily
experiences of interacting with other farmers and middlemen and they also have experience
in the field that is relevant to the tasks that they must perform in the experiment.
2Eggleston, Jensen and Zeckhauser, (2002): "Although trust may develop over multiple trans-
actions, the paucity of information continues to handicap the farmer since he cannot inde-
pendently assess the integrity of the dealer, or the reasonableness of the price he offers”;
Opening quote from Aker and Fafchamps (2011): “[With a mobile phone], no dishonest
trader can cheat me when I buy and sell.”
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is uninformed about the market price. The model predicts that there will be
a non-monotonic relationship between the benefit of information to the farmer
and the cost of switching to a different middleman. If the degree of competition
between middlemen is high (i.e. the switching cost is low) then the farmer does
not need to be informed about the market price in order to get a good offer
from the middleman. As the cost of switching becomes higher, the benefit to the
farmer of being informed also increases. For this region of the switching cost,
information and competition act as substitutes. Once the switching cost is high
enough, however, the bad middleman no longer needs to disguise his type and
once again price information will not help the farmer.
The results from the experiment show that middlemen do vary in their at-
titudes towards fairness and that ‘bad’ types tend to make lower offers in the
second round of the game. In the first round, the ‘bad’ type of middleman also
makes higher offers when the farmer is informed. For all levels of switching costs,
the farmer receives a higher average offer when he is informed, with the benefit of
information varying with the switching cost. These findings confirm the relevance
of the theory in interpreting the data.
Taken together, the approach and results confirm the importance of institu-
tional arrangements in the agricultural sector to the welfare of farmers. There is
long-standing suspicion of the role that middleman play in monopolistic settings
and it is instructive to see that information provision can have an impact in this
setting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of
the relevant literature. The theoretical model is presented in Section 3. Section
4 describes the experimental design. The experimental results are presented in
Section 5. Section 6 briefly discusses the potential effects of an intervention to
increase access to price information and Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
The issue of exploitation of farmers by middlemen is not new and has been de-
bated for decades.3 The existing literature relating to middlemen has tended to
view middlemen as either fulfilling an important role in the market or as being
purely exploitative. This paper builds on this literature by allowing for the pres-
3Bauer and Yamey (1968).
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ence of both types of middlemen in the same market. Biglaiser (1993), Biglaiser
and Friedman (1994) and Li (1997) present models in which middlemen act as
guarantors of quality in markets where the quality of the good being traded is
uncertain and middlemen invest in becoming experts. Another important role
that middlemen can play is in reducing the search costs in markets with frictions.
Van Raalte and Webers (1997) present a model where intermediation is necessary
for matching to occur, whereas Rubinstein and Wollinsky (1987) show how mid-
dlemen can shorten the time period between transactions because they increase
the likelihood of matches occurring. Jori and Leach (2002) demonstrate how
middlemen can improve efficiency by improving match quality in markets with
heterogeneous buyers and sellers. Masters (2007 and 2008), on the other hand,
assumes that middlemen are purely exploitative and shows how their presence can
reduce the efficiency of markets. Finally, a number of studies investigate com-
petition between middlemen and either ‘market makers’ or direct sales between
consumers and producers.4
In terms of the empirical evidence, Hayami, Kikuchi and Marciano (1999) find
that there is a high degree of competition between middlemen in the market for
rice in the Philippines. They state that it is very easy for farmers to switch to a
different trading partner if they are not satisfied with their current relationship
and this means that farmers are not exploited in this market. Conversely, Mitra
and Sarkar (2003) find that the potato market in West Bengal is controlled by a
small number of traders who earn oligopolistic profits. Fafchamps and Hill (2008)
investigate the transmission of increases in coffee prices in Uganda. They state
that high search costs exist and farmers are not well informed about prices. As
a result, increases in prices are not passed on to producers. Another important
source of middlemen’s market power can be high transport costs as shown by
Minten and Kyle (1999) and Merel, Sexton and Suzuki (2009).
In recent years, a number of empirical studies have investigated the effect of
price information on producer prices in developing countries and the results have
been mixed. The theoretical framework presented in this paper could help us to
interpret these results as they are consistent with the prediction that the effect
of information will vary with the competitive environment. Svensson and Yana-
gizawa (2008) found that having access to regular market information via radio
was associated with 15% higher farm gate prices in Uganda. The results from
an experiment in Rwanda, on the other hand, found no effect of having a mobile
phone on prices received by farmers, although the authors report that the ran-
4Rust and Hall (2005); Spulber (2002); Fingleton (1997); Vesala (2008).
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domization mechanism was problematic and so the results should be interpreted
with caution (Futch and McIntosh, 2009). A recent study by Fafchamps and
Minten (2011) looks at the effect of SMS-based agricultural information on pro-
ducer prices in India and finds that access to this information did not significantly
increase the prices that they received, whereas Muto and Yamano (2009) found
that in Uganda mobile phone coverage had a positive effect on farm-gate prices
for bananas. They did not find a significant impact on prices for maize, however.
Aker and Fafchamps (2011) also find that the effect of mobile phones varies by
crop in Niger. They report that there is no significant effect on average producer
prices but there is a reduction in the variability of prices for cowpea. They do not
find the same effect for millet, however. Using examples from Tanzania, Molony
(2008) argues that the ability of producers to use price information may be lim-
ited by the fact that they are tied in to relationships with particular middlemen
and are dependent on them for credit. Since they do not have an option to trade
with someone else if they are unhappy with the price they receive, being informed
about the market price does not help them. These results give some support to
the idea that the benefit of information to farmers will vary depending on what
options are available to them. The perishability of the crop will be an important
element of this, and so we would expect to see the results varying by crop.
This paper also draws on the large literature which focuses on bargaining
with incomplete information. One strand of this literature has allowed for the
preferences of one of the players to be unknown to the other, such as Rubinstein
(1985) who presents a model where one of the players has incomplete information
about the time preferences of the other player. Other authors address the issue
of bargaining when the seller has incomplete information about the valuation of
the buyer and investigate how players can use the cost of delay to communicate
information.5 This paper adds to this literature by allowing for two kinds of
uncertainty and also allowing for the outside option of one of the players to be
unknown to that player.
Finally, this paper builds on a number of experimental studies which have
looked at the importance of fairness and deception in ultimatum games.6 It
contributes to this literature by investigating how the ability to deceive depends
on how easy it is to find a new trading partner.
5Sobel and Takahashi (1983); Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1987); Cramton (1984); Blouin
and Serrano (2001); Sen (2000); Grossman and Perry (1986); Srivastava, Chakravarti and
Rapoport (2000).
6Boles, Cross and Murnighan (2000); Pillutla and Murnighan (1995); Croson, Boles and
Murnighan (2003)
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1.3 Model
1.3.1 Description of Economic Environment
There are a number of characteristics of the relationship between a farmer and a
middleman that are specific to a developing country setting. The key character-
istics that I will focus on in this paper are the following: (i) middlemen are better
informed about market conditions than farmers, (ii) farmers face high transport
costs to go to the market themselves, (iii) farmers often trade with the same
middleman for multiple periods, and (iv) the existence of frictions in the market
means it is not costless for the farmer to find a different middleman to trade with.
The model presented in this section will aim to capture these characteristics in
the simplest way possible.
The core intuition of the model is most easily demonstrated using a model
where there are only two possible values of the price and that is what I will
present in this section. However, it is reasonably straightforward to extend the
model to allow for more than two prices and the key predictions of the model
remain the same.7 I will describe a two-period model of trade between a farmer
and a middleman. At the start of the first period, a farmer and middleman are
matched and have an opportunity to trade. The farmer has a good which has a
market price, p. This price is independently and identically distributed in each
period, with p ∈ {pL, pH} , pH > pL, and Pr(p = pH) = λ. The middleman
observes pt in each period but the farmer knows only the distribution of p. The
middleman makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, xt, to the farmer. The farmer can
accept the middleman’s offer or he can go to the market himself to sell the good
but he must pay a transport cost, τ , in order to do so. The middleman’s transport
costs are normalized to zero. Gains from trade exist as the middleman’s transport
costs are lower than those of the farmer. The middleman’s outside option is also
normalized to zero.
I assume that the middleman may be one of two types, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, i ∈
{G,B} , with Pr(i = B) = q. The farmer does not know the type of a given
middleman but he does know that the probability that he is a bad type is equal
to q. A good middleman will always split the gains from trade equally, and so he
will offer pt− 12τ . A bad middleman will behave strategically and will choose x in
order to maximize his expected payoff. At the end of the first period, the farmer
7The case with three prices is presented in the appendix.
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may decide to stay matched with the same middleman for the second period, or
he may pay a cost κ to be matched with a new middleman. The type of the
second middleman is an independent draw from an identical distribution to that
of the first middleman. If the farmer decides to switch to a new middlemen,
then the first middleman will receive zero in the second period. In the second
period, the middleman observes p2 and makes an offer, x2, to the farmer, which
the farmer may accept or reject. There is no discounting and the farmer and
the bad middleman aim to maximize the sum of their own payoffs from the two
periods.
In this game, the farmer has two choices to make. Firstly, he may decide
whether to accept the middleman’s offer for that period or go to the market
himself. Secondly, he must decide whether to stay matched with the same mid-
dleman for the second period or to pay the cost κ and be matched with a new
middleman. His first decision simply depends on whether or not the middleman’s
offer is greater than his expected return from going to the market. The second
decision depends on his beliefs about the middleman’s type given the offer made
in the first period. I assume that it is always better for a farmer to trade with a
good middleman than a bad middleman. This requires the following assumption
about the parameter values: τ > 2λ(pH − pL). Since a farmer always prefers to
be matched with the good type in the second period, this means that it may be
optimal for the bad middleman to give the impression that he is a good type in
the first period to avoid losing the opportunity to trade with the farmer in the
second period.
The bad middleman will choose x1 in order to maximize the sum of his expected
payoff from the two periods:
max
x1
ρ(x1)(p1 − x1) + σ(x1)ρ(x2)(E(p2)− x2)
where ρ(x) is the probability that the farmer accepts the middleman’s offer and
σ(x) is the probability that the farmer does not switch to a new middleman for
the second period, given the middleman’s offer in the first period.
1.3.2 Equilibrium
This is a two-period game of incomplete information between the farmer and the
middleman and in what follows I will characterize the perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium of this game. Since I have already assumed that τ > 2λ(pH−pL), this means
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that it is always possible for the middleman to offer the farmer the expected value
of his outside option.8
1.3.2.1 Second period
In the second period, the bad middleman’s only concern is whether or not the
farmer will accept or reject his offer. As long as the middleman’s offer is greater
than or equal to the farmer’s expected outside option given his beliefs about the
market price, then it is optimal for the farmer to accept his offer. The pure
strategy equilibrium of the game is as follows:9
The bad middleman always offers x∗2 = λpH + (1− λ)pL − τ , and the farmer’s
strategy is
ρ∗(x2) =
1 x2 ≥ λpH + (1− λ)pL − τ0 x2 < λpH + (1− λ)pL − τ
The farmer’s expected payoff if he is matched with a bad middleman in the
second period is E(p)− τ . The good middleman will offer p2− 12τ . The expected
gain for a farmer from being matched with a good middleman rather than a bad
middleman in the second period is, therefore, equal to 12τ . The expected payoff
in the second period for a type B middleman, if the farmer continues to trade
with him, is τ .
1.3.2.2 Decision to switch
Let µx denote the farmer’s belief that the type of the middleman that he is
currently matched with is B, given x1. The farmer will therefore decide to switch
to a new middleman if
(µx − q) 12τ > κ
I assume that the farmer forms his beliefs according to Bayes’ rule.
8In order for the middleman to be willing to offer the farmer the expected value of his outside
option, the following must be true: pL > λpH + (1 − λ)pL − τ . This will be true if τ >
λ(pH − pL).
9There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium but the expected payoff to the farmer is the same in
both equilibria. The strategies of the mixed strategy equilibrium are as follows: x∗2 = pH−τ
if p2 = pH and pL − τ if p2 = pL, and ρ∗(x2) = 1 if x2 ≥ pH − τ , τpH−pL+τ if x2 = pL − τ
and 0 if x2 < pL − τ .
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1.3.2.3 First period
In this section, I will describe the intuition behind the main results of the model.
A formal proof can be found in the appendix. In the first period, the good
middleman will offer either xL = pL − 12τ or xH = pH − 12τ . It is therefore
reasonable to assume that the farmer’s posterior beliefs will assign probability
zero to the good type for any other x. Given that this is the case, there are three
possible equilibrium strategies for the bad type of middleman: xL, xH or xB,
where xB = λpH + (1− λ)pL − τ . Given that any offer other than xL or xH will
lead the farmer to believe that the middleman is type B with probability 1, xB
dominates any other x′ /∈ {xL, xH}. If the middleman offers x′ > xB, his payoff
in the first period will be lower without changing the probability that the farmer
will continue to trade with him in the second period and, if he offers x′ < xB, the
farmer will reject his offer and take up his outside option instead.
In this period, the middleman has to worry about two things. Firstly, whether
the farmer will accept or reject his offer for this period. Secondly, whether or not
the farmer will continue to trade with him in the second period. He must weigh
up the extra gain from offering a low price this period against the probability of
losing the farmer’s trade next period if the farmer’s belief that he is a bad type is
high enough for him to switch. The more costly it is for the farmer to switch, the
less the middleman has to worry about disguising his type as even if the farmer’s
belief that he is type B is very high, he still might not be willing to pay the cost
to switch. In the extreme case, when the cost of switching is high enough, the
middleman can reveal his type and the farmer still won’t switch. This leads us
to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: If the level of competition in the market is low, i.e. κ >
(1− q) 12τ , the bad type does not need to conceal his type. In this situation, im-
proving the farmer’s access to price information will not increase the expected
price that he receives in the first period.
If κ > (1− q) 12τ , it is too costly for the farmer to switch to a different mid-
dleman even if he knows for certain that the one he is matched with is type B.
Given that this is true, the bad type has no incentive to pretend to be a good type
and therefore will offer the lowest price that the farmer will be willing to accept,
which is xB. Since the bad type is already revealing his type, price information
will not help the farmer to get a higher price.
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If κ < (1 − q)12τ , on the other hand, the middleman must try to disguise
his type. If the farmer does not know when the market price is high then the
middleman can still appear to be a typeGmiddleman by offering xL when p = pH .
As long as κ is high enough, the farmer will not switch when he receives an offer
of xL as it is possible that the middleman could be a type G middleman and
p = pL.
Proposition 2: For an intermediate level of competition, i.e. (1− q) 12τ >
κ > λq(1−q)
q+(1−q)(1−λ)
1
2τ , the bad type of middleman will need to disguise his type or
else the farmer will switch to a new trading partner for the second period. For
this level of competition, the expected price that the farmer receives in the first
period will be higher with price information.
Since κ < (1− q) 12τ , if the farmer knows that the middleman’s type is B with
certainty, then he will switch to a different middleman for the second period. The
middleman cannot offer xB, therefore, without losing the farmer’s trade in the
second period. κ is high enough, however, that even if the type B middleman
always offers xL, the farmer will not switch when he receives an offer of xL. This
is because the probability that the middleman is a type G middleman with a low
price is high enough that the farmer does not want to pay the cost of switching. If,
on the other hand, the farmer knows that the price is high, the type B middleman
can no longer get away with offering him the low price as this will reveal his type.
Now, the type B middleman must always offer xH when the price is high and so
the expected price that the farmer receives is higher when he is informed about
the market price.
Proposition 3: As the level of competition in the market increases, the benefit
to the farmer of being informed about the market price decreases.
If κ < λq(1−q)
q+(1−q)(1−λ)
1
2τ , the farmer will prefer to switch to a new middleman when
he receives a low offer if the type B middleman’s strategy is to always offer xL.
That means that this can no longer be an equilibrium. Now, the middleman must
sometimes offer xH in order for the farmer to remain indifferent between staying
matched with him and switching to a new middleman. The farmer will stay
matched with the middleman when he receives an offer of xL with the probability
σ∗(xL) which makes the middleman indifferent between offering xH and xL:
σ∗(xL) =
τ − (pH − pL)
τ
.
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The probability that the type B middleman offers xL when the price is high (γH)
decreases as κ decreases:
γ∗H =
(1− λ)κ
λ[12q(1− q)τ − qκ]
,
which means that the benefit to the farmer of being informed about the price
also decreases.
In each case, the key variable that determines the expected payoff to the farmer
is the probability that the middleman offers xH when the price is high. If the
level of competition is very low, then this probability is zero with or without
price information as the middleman never needs to disguise his type. For an
intermediate level of competition, the probability that the type B middleman
makes a high offer when the price is high is zero if the farmer is uninformed
about the price but 1 if the farmer is informed. This is the situation where
information is most valuable to the farmer. As the level of competition increases
(i.e. κ decreases), however, the probability that the middleman makes a high
offer when the farmer is uninformed also increases and thus price information
becomes less valuable to the farmer. This is demonstrated in Figure 1, assuming
q = 12 and setting τ = 300, pH = 550, pL = 350 and λ =
1
2 , which were the values
used in the experiment.
Figure 1.1: The probability that type B offers xH when p = pH .
The benefit to the farmer of being informed comes entirely through the first
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period offer. Price information does not cause bad types to be pushed out of the
market, it just forces them to behave like good types in the first period. Figure
2 shows how the benefit of information to the farmer varies with κ and with the
share of type B middlemen in the population, q, for the same parameter values
as in the previous figure. As q increases, the point at which information stops
being useful decreases, as the farmer will be less inclined to switch if there are
more bad types in the population. For the region of κ over which he would be
willing to switch, however, information is more valuable if the proportion of bad
types in the population is higher.
Figure 1.2: Expected offer in the first round with price information minus the
expected offer without price information.
As these figures show, as long as the cost of switching is low enough that the
bad type must try to appear like a good type, information and competition act as
substitutes. Price information forces the bad type to always behave like a good
type, achieving the same outcome that we would have if κ were equal to zero. Of
course, the benefit of this to the farmer depends on how far away we were from
this outcome without information.
1.4 Experimental design and procedures
In this section, I will describe the details of a framed field experiment which I
carried out with farmers and middlemen in Gujarat, India. The experiment was
designed to map as closely as possible onto the set-up of the model. A key as-
sumption of the model is that there are different types of middlemen who have
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different attitudes towards fairness, which cause them to make different offers to
farmers. Carrying out an experiment with actual farmers and middlemen means
that we can investigate whether or not this is the case in reality. There is of
course a trade-off between being able to precisely estimate the causal effects of
information through one channel and having to abstract away from other factors.
A framed field experiment allows us to exogenously vary the degree of competi-
tion between middlemen and the amount of information that farmers have, while
controlling for everything else. This gives us the opportunity to isolate one mech-
anism through which information could affect the prices that farmers receive from
middlemen but it also retains relevance for the real world as participants can draw
on their experiences from real bargaining situations when making decisions in the
experiment.
The participants were recruited by Reuters Market Light, an organization
that runs an SMS-based agricultural information service for farmers in India.
RML have strong links with APMCs (Agricultural Produce Marketing Commit-
tee) across Gujarat and so were able to facilitate the recruitment of participants
through the markets. The majority of participants were not RML customers.
Sessions were carried out at various agricultural markets across Gujarat. Each
session had an average of 20 participants,10 half of whom were farmers and half
of whom were middlemen, and there were 15 sessions in total. The participants
were all from the local area where the session was being carried out but we were
assured that individual farmers and middlemen who participated did not have
strong personal relationships with one another outside of the experiment. Ses-
sions began with all of the participants together. An explanation of what we
were going to do was given and participants were asked to sign a consent form.
Each participant was then given a questionnaire to fill out and some short games
designed to elicit participants’ preferences regarding fairness were played. This
was followed by the bargaining game.
1.4.1 Middleman type
The key dimension of heterogeneity addressed in the model is attitudes towards
fairness and so it is important that we obtain a measure for this in the experiment.
With this in mind, the participants were asked to play two games at the beginning
of the experimental session which were designed to elicit their attitudes towards
fairness. The first game was a simple dictator game. The participants were told
10A number of sessions had 22 or 24, one session had 18 and one session had 14.
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that they would each be given Rs.50. They were also told that they had been
randomly and anonymously matched with another participant to whom they
could give some of this money. They were asked how many rupees they would
like to give to the other participant11.
The participants were then asked to play a game designed to test their inter-
personal orientation. This test requires participants to make a choice between
three possible allocations of points to themselves and an anonymous ‘other’. The
options consist of one choice which maximizes the points allocated to oneself,
another that equalizes the payoffs to both but gives a lower payoff to oneself than
the first choice and a final choice which maximizes the relative payoff to oneself
but gives a lower absolute payoff than the first choice. Each option corresponds
to a different personality type: individualistic, prosocial or competitive. The
instructions for the game are provided in the appendix. In the example given
there, A is the ‘competitive’ choice, B is the ‘prosocial’ choice and C is the ‘indi-
vidualistic’ choice. The participants are required to make nine such choices with
different payoff values. If they make six or more choices consistent with one of the
types then they are classified as that type. It has been shown in previous studies
that participants’ offers in ultimatum games, and whether or not they behave
strategically, are correlated with this measure of personality type (van Djik, de
Cremer and Handgraff (2002) and Carpenter (2003)).
The results from these games provide us with a number of different potential
measures of a ‘bad’ type of middleman. In what follows, I construct a number
of alternative measures and investigate how the results differ depending on the
measure used.
1.4.2 Bargaining game
The experiment had six different treatment cells: there were two information
treatments (informed and uninformed) combined with three costs of switching
(Rs.10, Rs.40 and Rs.90). These costs of switching were chosen to map on to
the different regions of κ described in the model, assuming that q was equal
to 12 . The values for the parameters of the game were chosen to match the
assumptions of the model as closely as possible and to give the participants a
11It is important to note that this is not a standard dictator game as in this game all participants
receive some money and can choose how much to give away. We wanted to elicit the
preferences of all participants, however, so it was decided that this was the best way to do
this. The results are therefore not comparable to a standard dictator game but they do
generate an ordinal measure of fairness which can be used in the empirical analysis.
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large enough expected payoff that they would care about the outcome of the
game. There were five possible values for the price, ranging from Rs.350 to
Rs.550. The farmer’s transport costs were set equal to Rs.300. In the set-up
of the model, the middleman’s outside option was normalized to zero. However,
piloting showed that participants strongly dislike the possibility of getting a payoff
of zero and this affects their choices in the game, so it was decided to give them a
small, non-zero outside option instead. A summary of the parameter values can
be found in Table 1.
Table 1.1: Parameter values in experiment
Parameter Value (Rs.)
price 350, 400, 450, 500, 550
τ 300
κH 90
κM 40
κL 10
Outside option for middleman 40
Since there were likely to be significant differences between participants in
different sessions and there were only 15 sessions in total, it was decided that all
of the participants should each play all 6 types of game. This allows individual
fixed effects to be calculated. The order in which the games were played was
varied across sessions. The rules of the game were explained to the participants
in detail with the use of examples. They were asked questions to make sure that
they understood how the game would work. After the explanation, the farmers
and middlemen were separated.12 A space was kept between each participant to
ensure that they could not influence each other or look at each other’s responses.
In each session, the participants played six games, consisting of two rounds each.
At the start of each game, the participants were reminded of the conditions of
the game i.e. the cost of switching and whether or not the farmers were informed
about the market price. Each farmer was randomly and anonymously matched
with a different middleman at the start of each game.
At the start of the round, the market price for the round was chosen. There
were five possible values for the price: Rs.350, Rs.400, Rs.450, Rs.500, Rs.550.
A middleman was asked to select a ball from a bag containing five balls, one
corresponding to each of the five prices. The middlemen were told the market
price and in the full-information games, the farmers were also told the price. In
12For most of the sessions they were put in separate rooms. For a few sessions, they were at
opposite ends of a large hall.
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the uninformed games, the farmers knew the possible values that the price could
take, and that each one was equally likely. Each middleman was then given a form
and asked to write down the offer that they would like to make to the farmer. Each
form had a code on it to match the offer to the relevant middleman and farmer
but this code changed between games and the participants could not identify their
trading partner from this code. Once the middleman had written down an offer,
the form was passed to the farmer with whom he had been matched. The farmer
was then asked if he wanted to accept this offer and circled either ‘yes’ or ‘no’
on the form. If the farmer chose ‘yes’, then his payoff from that round was equal
to the offer and the middleman’s payoff was equal to the market price minus the
offer. If the farmer chose ‘no’, then his payoff was the market price minus Rs.300
(representing transport costs) and the middleman’s payoff was Rs.40.
After all of the farmers had decided whether or not to accept the middleman’s
offer, they were given another form asking them whether they would like to switch
to a different middleman for the second round. They were reminded of the cost
that they would have to pay if they said ‘yes’. If a farmer decided to switch,
then the first middleman only received Rs.40 for the second round. Once all
farmers had made this choice, the second round began. A new price was chosen
and the middlemen were given an offer form. If some farmers had decided to
switch, then some middlemen received two forms in the second period as they
were then matched with two farmers. They were told that they should make
offers to two farmers but they would only get paid for one of the offers, which
would be selected randomly. If a farmer chose to switch to a different middleman,
then the first middleman did not receive a form in the second round, unless he
was rematched with a different farmer who had also chosen to switch. In this
case, the middleman was told that he would get paid the outcome for one of the
rounds that would be chosen randomly and would receive only Rs.40 for the other
round. Once all the middlemen had made offers, the forms were passed to the
farmers who again chose to accept or reject. The game then ended.
The participants were paid for both rounds of one of the games which was
selected randomly at the end. In general, middlemen tend to be wealthier than
farmers and results from piloting suggested that the amounts of money involved
were not as significant for the middlemen. In order to get them to care more
about the game, therefore, one middleman was chosen randomly at the end of
each session and that middleman’s payoff from the game was tripled. Participants
were informed of this before the game was played.
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A summary of the timing of the bargaining game is as follows:
1. Farmers and middlemen are matched into pairs for Game 1.
2. All participants are told the cost of switching for that game and whether
the farmers will be informed or uninformed about the price.
3. Round 1 begins. The price for Round 1 is chosen and told to the middlemen
and also to the farmers in the informed treatments.
4. Each middleman writes down his offer on the offer sheet. This sheet is
passed to the farmer that he has been matched with. Each farmer chooses
to accept or reject the middleman’s offer.
5. Each farmer is given a sheet of paper which asks him if he wants to stay
matched with the same middleman for the second round or pay a cost to
be matched with a new middleman. He chooses to switch or not to switch.
6. Farmers who choose to switch are matched with a different middleman for
the second period. This means that some middlemen are matched with two
farmers for the second period.
7. Round 2 begins. The price for Round 2 is chosen and told to the middlemen
and also to the farmers in the informed treatments.
8. Each middleman who is playing in this round writes down his offer on the
offer sheet (or two offer sheets if he is matched with two farmers). This
sheet is passed to the farmer that he has been matched with. Each farmer
chooses to accept or reject the middleman’s offer.
9. Game 1 ends.
10. Each farmer is matched with a different middleman for Game 2.
11. The above steps are repeated 5 times, once for each treatment type, i.e. 6
games are played in total.
26
1.5 Experimental Results
This section will present the results from the experiment following the order in
which the model was presented. Firstly, I will discuss the results for the second
period offers. I will investigate the effect of being informed in the second round
and, using the exogenous measures of ‘bad’ obtained from the tests of fairness, I
will present results which demonstrate that these types of middlemen do actually
make lower offers in the second round. Secondly, I will present the results for the
farmer’s decision to switch and show that they are consistent with the predictions
of the model. Finally, I will discuss the results for the first period offers which
show that farmers receive higher offers when they are informed but that the
magnitude of this effect varies with the cost of switching. I will also present
results which demonstrate that bad types are forced to make higher offers in the
first round when the farmer is informed.
1.5.1 Second period offers
1.5.1.1 Effect of information
The model predicts that the offer that the middleman makes in the second period
should not be affected by whether or not the farmer is informed. However, we
can see from the results in Table 3 that even in the second round, the average
offer that the farmer receives is around Rs.20 higher when he is informed about
the market price. The most likely explanation for this result is that farmers are
risk averse, which would mean that they would be willing to accept a lower offer
rather than face the uncertainty of going to the market themselves.
1.5.1.2 Middleman characteristics
According to the assumptions of the model, the ‘bad’ type of middleman will
make a lower offer in the second period. As mentioned earlier, we have a number
of different measures of ‘bad’ type available to us, based on the results of the dic-
tator game and test of interpersonal orientation. The different measures used are
as follows: (i) classified as ‘competitive’ on the test of interpersonal orientation,
(ii) classified as ‘competitive’ or ‘individualistic’ on the test of interpersonal ori-
entation, (iii) gave less than Rs.15 in the dictator game, (iv) gave less then Rs.25
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on the dictator game, and (v) classified as ‘competitive’ or gave less than Rs.15
on the dictator game. Table 4 presents results using these different measures.
The variable ‘bad’ is a dummy equal to one if the middleman was classified as a
‘bad’ type according to the particular measure used.
The results of these regressions clearly show that certain types of middlemen
make lower offers in the second round. The only measure of ‘bad’ type that
does not make a significantly lower offer in the second round is the measure
that includes those middlemen who were classified as ‘individualistic’ on the test
of interpersonal orientation. For the other measures of the ‘bad’ type, these
middlemen make offers that are Rs.17-38 lower than the other middlemen. These
results demonstrate that differences in attitudes towards fairness do exist among
actual middlemen and these differences translate into significantly lower offers for
farmers.
1.5.2 Decision to switch
Table 5 presents results from the following regression:
Sit = α + β1Informedt + β2medium costt + β3high costt
+β4medium costt ∗ Informedt + β5high costt ∗ Informedt
+β6ln(price)t + β7ln(price)t ∗ Informedt + it
where Sit is a dummy equal to 1 if farmer i decided to switch in period t,
Informedt is a dummy equal to 1 if the farmers knew the market price in round
t, medium costt is a dummy equal to one if the cost of switching in round t was
Rs.40 and high costt is a dummy equal to 1 if the cost of switching in round t
was equal to Rs.90.13
The results support the predictions of the model. The farmer is more likely
to switch if he is uninformed about the price. If he is uninformed, he is less
likely to switch as the cost of switching increases but since β2 and β4 are similar
in magnitude and of opposite sign, as are β3 and β5, it seems that when the
farmer is informed, he is equally likely to switch at any cost. If the farmer is
informed about the price, then he is more likely to switch when the market price
13The offer was not included in the regression as it is endogenous to the switching decision.
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is higher. The negative coefficient on ln(price) is most likely picking up the
positive correlation between the offer and the price (since in this case the farmer
does not observe the price, he only observes the offer), suggesting that the higher
the offer, the less likely the farmer is to switch. These results suggest not only
that different types of middlemen exist and make different offers, but also that
the farmers are aware of this. If there were no differences in middlemen types
then there would be no reason for the farmer to pay a cost to switch to a different
middleman for the second period.
1.5.3 First period offer
1.5.3.1 Effect of information
Table 6 presents the results for the first period offer. A ‘low cost’ dummy equal
to one when the cost of switching was Rs.10 is included. As can be seen from
the results in the table, the benefit of information is higher in the low cost treat-
ment, although there is still a benefit of information in the other treatments.
As was shown in the previous table, the probability that the farmer switched
was very similar when the cost of switching was Rs.40 and when it was Rs.90
which supports the idea that participants did not behave differently in these two
treatments. It was found that there was no difference in the effect of information
between the medium and high cost of switching treatments and these results are
not reported. This result could be consistent with the model if the actual cut-off
point for κ, above which we should see no effect of information, was less than
Rs.40. The costs were chosen based on the assumption that the proportion of
‘bad’ middlemen in the population was equal to 50%. In reality, it was less than
this and, depending on the measure of ‘bad’ that we use, could have been as low
as 10%. This should actually increase the value of the highest cut-off for κ, how-
ever, rather than reduce it. The results from Table 3 could give us an indication
of what else is going on. These results suggest that the difference between the
offer made by the ‘bad’ type and the ‘good’ type is much lower than initially
assumed. The highest estimate that we get for this difference is Rs.38.43. If this
is the expected gain from being matched with a good type rather than a bad
type, then we shouldn’t expect to see any switching when the cost of switching is
Rs.40 or above and the benefit of information should disappear at this point. As
mentioned before, we still find a positive effect of information for the Rs.40 and
Rs.90 treatments but the magnitude of this effect is similar to that found in the
case of second round offers.
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1.5.3.2 Middleman characteristics
Table 7 presents the results from the first round including the various measures
of a ‘bad’ type. The results are comparable to those found for second round
offers. Depending on the measure of ‘bad’ used, the results show that the ‘bad’
middlemen make offers that are Rs.13-48 lower than other middlemen.
1.5.3.3 Effect of information on the offers made by ‘bad’ types
According to the model, only some middlemen should use the farmer’s lack of
information to make lower offers in the first round. This means there should be a
greater advantage to being informed when matched with one of these middlemen.
Table 8 reports the results of regressions which include an interaction between
‘bad’ and ‘informed’ for three of the measures of ‘bad’ used in the previous table.
The coefficient on bad*informed is positive and significant in the first column
where the measure of ‘bad’ is whether or not the middleman was classified as
‘competitive’. Column 2 shows that this result is robust to clustering the stan-
dard errors at the session level. Columns 3 and 4 present results from the same
regression with a middleman classified as ‘bad’ if he gave Rs.15 or less on the dic-
tator game. The coefficient on bad*informed is still positive in this case although
it is not significantly different from zero. In the final two columns, the ‘bad’
dummy is equal to 1 if the middleman was classified as ‘competitive’ on the test
of interpersonal orientation or if he gave less than Rs.15 on the dictator game.
Once again, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant.
The size of the coefficient on the ‘bad’ dummy in these regressions ranges from
-40.97 to -66.98 and the coefficient on the interaction term ranges from 19.70
to 38.03. These results clearly demonstrate that ‘bad’ types make significantly
lower offers in the first round when farmers are uninformed but they increase
their offers when the farmer knows the exact value of the market price.
1.5.4 Summary of results
It is clear from the results of the experiment that actual middlemen differ in their
attitudes towards fairness and this has relevance for the offers that they make to
farmers. Farmers are better off with information in both rounds but there is an
additional benefit of being informed in the first round if the cost of switching is
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low. This is driven by the result that ‘bad’ middlemen will offer lower prices if the
farmer is uninformed, but are forced to offer higher prices if the farmer is informed
in order to prevent the farmer from switching away from him. These results are
consistent with reports from farmers who state that dishonest middlemen can no
longer take advantage of them when they have better information about market
prices.
1.6 Implications
The results from the model and the experiment suggest that even when a farmer’s
options of who to trade with in a given period are constrained, informing farmers
about market prices can lead to an increase in the offer that the farmer receives
from the middleman. A full analysis of the general welfare effects of this increase
in producer prices is beyond the scope of this paper. It is helpful, however, to
briefly discuss the potential ways in which welfare could be affected by this change
and the possible magnitude of these effects.
In the experiment, the average share of the surplus received by the farmer in the
first round increased from 60% to 69% in the case where the cost of switching was
Rs.40 or Rs.90 and to 74% when the cost of switching was Rs.10. We can see that
even in the case where the farmer was uninformed, the share of the surplus that
he received was quite high. This reflects the fact that most middlemen believed
that it was right for the farmer to receive a higher share of the surplus because in
general the farmer must also pay for the cost of production, and middlemen earn
income from trading with many farmers so the total amount that they earn will
be higher. This norm that farmers should receive a higher share of the surplus
seemed to affect decisions made in the game, which supports the idea that the
participants drew on their experiences from the real world when making choices
in the experiment.
A potential concern about interpreting the results from this experiment is
the likelihood that there was selection bias in the sample of participants. RML
decided to organize sessions in the areas where they thought it would be easiest
to recruit participants, which automatically introduces a bias. In addition, there
were two sessions where, part way through, the middlemen decided that they did
not want to participate in the experiment and they walked out of the session. It
would not be difficult to imagine that the type of middleman who would be more
willing to participate in a research project might also be the type of middleman
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who would offer higher prices, which means that the sample in the experiment is
probably not representative of the general population of middlemen in Gujarat.
If it is true that the ‘good’ types are the ones that are more likely to participate
in the experiment, however, then the bias created by this problem should work
against finding an effect of information. This means that the results from the
experiment should give us a lower bound on this effect.
The most direct effect of an increase in the farmer’s share of the surplus is a
simple transfer from middlemen to farmers. Even if there were no general welfare
effects from this, this is still an important result since, in general, farmers are
significantly poorer than middlemen. According to the World Development Re-
port (2008), Agriculture for Development: “Of the developing world’s 5.5 billion
people, 3 billion live in rural areas, nearly half of humanity. Of these rural in-
habitants an estimated 2.5 billion are in households involved in agriculture, and
1.5 billion are in smallholder households”. Even a small increase in the income
of these households could significantly improve their welfare.
In addition, however, an increase in farmers’ income is likely to have more
general welfare effects. It may lead to farmers being able to better manage risk
and therefore start producing more valuable but riskier crops or it may allow them
to save up in order to invest in better production technologies. This could lead
to an increase in overall agricultural productivity, which could have significant
effects on the economy.
If the average price that farmers receive increases, this may have an effect
on their production decisions which in turn could have a positive impact on
consumers. There are two ways in which production might change as a result
of increased prices for farmers. The first is a direct increase in supply as a
response to an increase in the price received. Farmers may decide to use inputs
more intensively since the return from production is higher. Getting a precise
estimate of the magnitude of this effect is difficult as good data on farm gate
prices, cost of production and middlemen margins are hard to find. In what
follows, however, I will present some back-of-the-envelope calculations to give an
idea of the possible magnitude of the effect of improving access to information
for farmers for two different crops in India. Table 2 presents data on the cost
of production, wholesale prices and farm gate prices for rice and soya bean from
2004-05.14
A number of assumptions are made in order to calculate the potential change
14Data on cost and wholesale prices from indiastat.com; data on producer prices from FAOstat.
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Table 1.2: Costs and prices for rice and soya bean in India, 2004-05 (Rs. per
quintal)
Cost of Production Producer price Wholesale Price
Paddy/Rice 530.94 898 1090
Soya bean 881.86 1010 1334
in price received as a result of better information. Firstly, the outside option of
the farmer is not known so it is not possible to work out the surplus from trade.
I will look instead at the total surplus from production which I assume is equal
to the sum of the profits earned by the farmer and the trader. According to
Acharya (2005), on average 20% of gross marketing margins go to the middleman
as profit. I will therefore assume that the middleman’s profit is 20% of the
difference between the wholesale price and the price paid to the producer. In line
with the results from the experiment, I will assume that the farmer’s share of
the surplus increases by 12 percent for soya bean. As the farmer’s share of the
surplus for rice is already 90%, it cannot increase by 12 percent, so I will assume
that it increases by 7 percentage points.
Using these assumptions, the implied increase in producer prices would lead
to a 7.7% increase in income for rice farmers and a 12% increase in income for
soya bean farmers. Using supply elasticities estimated in previous studies,15 this
suggests that this increase in prices could lead to an increase in the amount of
rice produced of between 423,000 and 619,000 tons and an increase in soya bean
production of between 30,000 and 50,000 tons.
The second effect of an increase in producer prices could come through the
composition of crops that farmers choose to produce, as suggested by Jensen
(2010). Since having access to price information should lead to a greater increase
in the prices received for crops where the level of competition is lower (as long
as we are above the level where there is no effect), this could lead to farmers
switching to producing more of these crops once they are informed. Since these
were the crops for which the greatest distortions existed prior to farmers becom-
ing informed, this should improve efficiency. Without detailed data on demand
and supply, however, it is not possible to say how these efficiency gains will be
distributed between producers and consumers.
The results presented in this paper have important policy implications. If
we want to increase the prices that farmers receive from middlemen because we
15Kumar et al. (2010); Mythili (2006).
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believe that middlemen have too much market power, then we have a couple of
options. Firstly, we could try and intervene directly in the market to reduce their
power. This has been tried before and has led to the setting up of agricultural
marketing boards, minimum price supports and the fair trade movement. There
are a number of reasons why we might not like this option. First of all, it might be
extremely costly. Secondly, we might create distortions that are as bad or worse
than the ones we are trying to fix. Finally, we might just end up transferring
market power from one group to another (such as the agricultural marketing
boards) and not having any effect on the prices that farmers receive. A second
option for achieving the goal of higher prices for farmers could be to provide them
with information about market prices. This might be a preferable option as it
still allows the market to do the work, it just makes sure that the agents in the
market have the best information possible to help them make decisions.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper presented a theoretical model outlining an important channel through
which better access to market information could increase the prices that farmers
receive from middlemen. The model introduced the idea of different types of
middlemen and demonstrated how price information constrains the ability of bad
types to offer lower prices to farmers and forces them instead to behave like
good types. The model also predicts that the relationship between the benefit
of information to the farmer and the degree of competition in the market will
be non-monotonic. This could explain why the results from empirical studies
investigating the impact of information on producer prices have been mixed.
The paper provided empirical support for the predictions of the model from a
framed field experiment carried out with actual farmers and middlemen in India.
The results from the experiment demonstrate that attitudes towards fairness do
vary among actual middlemen. By obtaining an exogenous measure of the mid-
dlemen’s attitudes towards fairness it was possible to show that middlemen who
cared less about fairness also made lower offers to farmers in the second round.
Providing farmers with information about prices was able to counteract this effect
in the first round as it forced the bad middlemen to make higher offers, demon-
strating that this is an important channel through which information could benefit
farmers. In addition, the results from the experiment showed that the benefit of
information varied with the cost of switching to a different middleman.
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In general, the literature has tended to either view middlemen as purely ex-
ploitative or as fulfilling a necessary role in the market. The results in this paper
suggest that we should take a more nuanced view and allow not just for the pos-
sibility that the truth lies somewhere in between but also that different types of
middlemen may exist in the same market and some may be more exploitative
than others. It is important to bear this in mind when carrying out empirical
studies.
In the model presented in this paper, I have assumed that the cost of switching
to a new middleman is exogenous. A potentially interesting avenue for future
research could be to investigate how the competitive environment itself could be
affected by information in the longer-term. The source of heterogeneity that I
have focused on in this paper is attitudes towards fairness but there are many
other possible ways in which middlemen could differ. In the model presented here,
bad types are not pushed out of the market but instead are forced to behave like
good types. If the difference between middlemen types comes through differences
in costs, then efficiency could be improved if the high cost types were forced out
of the market. The model presented in this paper could easily be extended to
allow for this effect and to investigate how effective price information could be at
changing the composition of middleman types in the market.
The focus of this paper has been on middlemen in agricultural markets in
developing countries. The idea of competition and information acting as substi-
tutes could be relevant to any number of situations, however.16 I believe that it
is applicable to any situation where one agent is tied in to a relationship with a
particular trading partner for some period of time, some trading partners may
be preferable to others and there is a cost to switching to a different partner, e.g.
telephone provider, bank etc.
The agricultural sector is hugely important in developing countries and is a
source of livelihoods for approximately 86 percent of rural people.17 Improving
efficiency in agricultural markets could have a major impact on the welfare of
the poor. The structure of the middleman market in this sector is extremely
complicated and much research remains to be done. The results from this paper
are encouraging, however, as they highlight one important channel through which
providing farmers with price information could help to counteract the market
16Although it looks at a very different context, the model in this paper is similar in spirit to
that presented in Besley and Smart (2007) which looks at the role of fiscal restraints on
politicians in a model with both moral hazard and adverse selection.
17World Development Report, 2008.
35
power of intermediaries.
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Table 3: Second period offer
(1) (2)
VARIABLES offer offer
Price 0.673*** 0.673***
(0.0262) (0.0321)
Informed 20.04*** 20.04***
(3.367) (5.437)
Constant 19.99 19.99
(24.71) (17.00)
Observations 942 942
R-squared 0.793 0.793
Clustered SE No Yes
Table 4: Second period offer with bad type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES offer offer offer offer offer
Price 0.674*** 0.672*** 0.672*** 0.672*** 0.675***
(0.0382) (0.0386) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0380)
Informed 17.45*** 17.40*** 17.50*** 17.33*** 17.42***
(4.902) (4.945) (4.921) (4.922) (4.869)
Bad -38.43*** -1.827 -23.83*** -17.17*** -36.14***
(9.488) (5.592) (7.800) (5.685) (6.658)
Constant 53.71** 53.31** 52.78** 52.87** 52.96**
(21.34) (21.55) (21.42) (21.43) (21.20)
Observations 942 942 942 942 942
R-squared 0.469 0.459 0.465 0.464 0.476
(4) Bad is a dummy equal to 1 if the middleman is classified as a 'bad' type. 
knows the market price.
(5) Informed is a dummy equal to 1 if the farmer 
interpersonal orientation; Column 2; 'bad' if classified as 'individualistic' or 'competitive'; 
The classification in each column is as follows: Column 1: 'bad' if 'competitive' on test of 
Column 3: 'bad' if gave less than Rs.15 on the dictator game; Column 4: 'bad' if gave less than
Rs.25 on the dictator game; Column 5: 'bad' if classified as 'competitive' or gave less than Rs.15
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(3) Session fixed effects included in all columns
on the dictator game.
Notes:
(1) Middlemen fixed effects are included.
(2) Standard errors in parentheses.
(4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
at the session level.
(3) When clustered, standard errors are clustered 
Table 5: Decision to switch
(1) (2)
VARIABLES switch switch
Informed -2.178** -2.178*
(0.926) (1.234)
medium cost -0.108*** -0.108**
(0.0341) (0.0387)
high cost -0.144*** -0.144***
(0.0344) (0.0453)
medium cost*informed 0.103** 0.103*
(0.0487) (0.0526)
high cost*informed 0.113** 0.113*
(0.0485) (0.0621)
ln(price) -0.262** -0.262*
(0.107) (0.132)
ln(price)*informed 0.344** 0.344
(0.151) (0.201)
Constant 1.689** 1.689*
(0.666) (0.821)
Observations 942 942
R-squared 0.232 0.232
Clustered SE No Yes
Notes:
(1) Farmer fixed effects are included.
(2) Standard errors in parentheses.
(3) When clustered, standard errors are clustered at the session level.
(4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(5) medium cost is a dummy equal to 1 if the  cost of switching is Rs. 40.
(6) high cost is a dummy equal to 1 if the cost of switching is Rs. 90.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES offer offer
Price 0.761*** 0.761***
(0.0294) (0.0348)
Informed 23.37*** 23.37**
(4.423) (8.413)
low cost 3.304 3.304
(5.421) (7.169)
low cost*informed 13.50* 13.50*
(7.684) (6.836)
Constant -25.70 -25.70
(25.73) (14.67)
Observations 942 942
R-squared 0.736 0.736
Clustered SE No Yes
Table 6: First period offer
Notes:
(1) Middlemen fixed effects are included.
(2) Standard errors in parentheses.
(3) When clustered, standard errors are clustered at the session level.
(4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES offer offer offer offer offer
Price 0.760*** 0.760*** 0.760*** 0.760*** 0.760***
(0.0405) (0.0410) (0.0407) (0.0409) (0.0402)
Informed 23.36*** 23.36*** 23.36*** 23.36*** 23.36***
(6.084) (6.161) (6.114) (6.148) (6.047)
low cost 3.298 3.298 3.298 3.298 3.298
(7.459) (7.555) (7.497) (7.538) (7.414)
low cost*informed 13.49 13.49 13.49 13.49 13.49
(10.58) (10.71) (10.63) (10.69) (10.51)
bad -47.96*** -5.716 -31.13*** -13.09** -40.74***
(9.650) (5.725) (7.943) (5.878) (6.755)
Constant -9.857 -14.26 -16.71 -16.71 -10.89
(22.05) (22.42) (22.11) (22.24) (21.89)
Observations 942 942 942 942 942
R-squared 0.410 0.395 0.404 0.397 0.417
than Rs.15 on the dictator game; Column 4: 'bad' if gave less than Rs.25 on the dictator game; Column 5:
 'bad' if 'competitive' or 'gave less than Rs.15 on the dictator game.
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(3) Session fixed effects included in all columns.
(4) bad is a dummy equal to 1 if the middleman is classified as a 'bad' type.
The classification in each column is as follows: Column 1: 'bad' if 'competitive' on test of 
interpersonal orientation; Column 2: 'bad' if 'competitive' or 'individualistic'; Column 3: 'bad' if gave less 
Table 7: First period offer with bad type
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES offer offer offer offer offer offer
Price 0.761*** 0.761*** 0.765*** 0.765*** 0.766*** 0.766***
(0.0404) (0.0315) (0.0408) (0.0330) (0.0402) (0.0321)
Informed 20.45*** 20.45** 20.73*** 20.73** 18.30*** 18.30**
(6.239) (7.777) (6.420) (8.339) (6.476) (8.429)
low cost 3.291 3.291 3.253 3.253 3.245 3.245
(7.447) (6.602) (7.493) (6.610) (7.399) (6.624)
low cost*informed 13.51 13.51* 13.61 13.61** 13.63 13.63**
(10.56) (6.300) (10.63) (6.325) (10.49) (6.336)
bad -66.98*** -66.98*** -40.97*** -40.97*** -54.45*** -54.45***
(13.41) (16.62) (10.83) (9.488) (9.271) (11.66)
bad*informed 38.03** 38.03** 19.70 19.70 27.40** 27.40***
(18.67) (16.61) (14.72) (13.74) (12.73) (9.044)
Constant -8.762 -8.762 -17.67 -17.67 -11.09 -11.09
(22.02) (15.52) (22.12) (14.77) (21.85) (15.09)
Observations 942 942 942 942 942 942
R-squared 0.413 0.413 0.405 0.405 0.420 0.420
Clustered SE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The classification in each column is as follows: Columns 1 and 2: ’bad’ if ’competitive’ on test of interpersonal orientation;
Column 3 and 4: ’bad’ if gave less than Rs. 15 on the dictator game; Column 5 and 6: ’bad’ if ’competitive’ or gave less than
Rs. 15 on the dictator game.
Table 8: First period offer with bad type and informed interaction.
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(3) Session fixed effects included in all columns.
(4) bad is a dummy equal to 1 if the middleman is classified as a ’bad’ type.
Appendix
Farmer’s beliefs and strategy
It is not possible to have an equilibrium where, when the farmer receives an offer
of xL, his belief that the middleman is a bad type is lower than his prior belief. If
this were the case, then he would never switch when he received a low offer, which
means that it would always be optimal for the strategic middleman to make a
low offer, which means that the farmer’s belief that the middleman is more likely
to be good when he receives a low offer could not be correct. Let γH denote the
probability that B offers xL when p = pH and γL denote the probability that
B offers xL when p = pL. The farmer’s posterior beliefs for each x observed in
equilibrium will be:
µB = 1
µH =
q[λ(1− γH) + (1− λ)(1− γL)]
q[λ(1− γH) + (1− λ)(1− γL)] + λ(1− q) ∈ [0, q]
µL =
q[λγH + (1− λ) γL]
q[λγH + (1− λ) γL] + (1− λ) (1− q) ∈ [q,
q
q + (1− q)(1− λ) ]
Let σx denote the probability that the farmer continues to trade with the same
middleman in the second period, given the middleman’s offer in the first period.
If the farmer receives an offer of xB, then his optimal strategy will depend on the
value of κ.
If κ > (1− q) 12τ , then σ∗B = 1
If κ = (1− q) 12τ , then σ∗B ∈ [0, 1]
If κ < (1− q) 12τ , then σ∗B = 0
Likewise, if the farmer receives an offer of xL, his optimal strategy will be as
follows
If κ > (µL − q) 12τ , then σ∗L = 1
If κ = (µL − q) 12τ , then σ∗L ∈ [0, 1]
If κ < (µL − q) 12τ , then σ∗L = 0
Finally, since µH < q, σ∗H = 1, regardless of the value of κ.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: For an intermediate level of competition, i.e. (1− q) 12τ > κ >
λq(1−q)
q+(1−q)(1−λ)
1
2τ , the bad type of middleman will need to disguise his type or else the
farmer will switch to a new trading partner for the second period. For this level
of competition, the expected price that the farmer receives in the first period will
be higher with price information.
Proof: (i) If the middleman makes an offer of xB the farmer will know that the
middleman’s type is B with certainty. If κ < (1− q) 12τ , the farmer will switch
to a new middleman with probability 1. Suppose p1 = pH . If the middleman
chooses to offer xB, his payoff will be:
pH − λpH − (1− λ)pL + τ
if he offers xH , his expected payoff will be:
pH − pH + 12τ + τ
As long as τ > 2(1 − λ)(pH − pL), the middleman will always prefer to offer xH
if offering xB will cause the farmer to switch with certainty. I will assume that
this condition holds18. If it is not optimal for him to offer xB when p = pH then
it will not be optimal for him to offer xB when p = pL.
(ii) If κ > λq(1−q)
q+(1−q)(1−λ)
1
2τ , then the cost of switching is high enough that even
if the farmer knows that the bad type always offers xL, he still will not switch
when he receives an offer of xL as the probability that he is matched with a good
type (but the market price is low) is high enough that it is not worth paying the
cost to switch. Since the farmer will never switch when he receives an offer of xL,
it is not optimal for the middleman to ever make a higher offer.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: As the level of competition in the market increases, the benefit
to the farmer of being informed about the market price decreases.
18I have already assumed that τ > 2λ(pH − pL). As long as the distribution of p is fairly even,
then it is not unreasonable to assume that this condition also holds
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Proof: If the middleman offers xH , his expected return will be:
p− pH + 12τ + τ
If he offers xL, his expected return will be:
p− pL + 12τ + σ
∗
Lτ
He will, therefore, be indifferent between offering xH and xL if σL = τ−(pH−pL)τ .
Assume γL = 1.19 The farmer will be indifferent between switching to a new
middleman and staying with the same one if:
κ =
(
q[λγH + (1− λ)]
q[λγH + (1− λ)] + (1− λ) (1− q) − q
)
1
2τ
which implies
γ∗H =
(1− λ)κ
λ[12q(1− q)τ − qκ]
which is increasing in κ.
Model with three prices
It is reasonably straightforward to extend the model to allow for the price to take
three values instead of two: pH , pM , and pL. Now, there will be four possible
prices that the type B middleman could offer in equilibrium:
xH = pH − 12τ
xM = pM − 12τ
xL = pL − 12τ
xB = E(p)− τ
19This equilibrium is not unique. As the condition that makes the middleman indifferent
between offering xH or xL is independent of the value of the market price, it will hold for
both p = pH and p = pL. It is not necessary that γL = 1 but the following must hold:
λγL + (1− λ)γH =
(1− λ)[(1− q)κ+ q(1− q) 12τ ]
q(1− q) 12τ − qκ
The expected return for the farmer in the first round, however, is the same for all of the
possible equilibria.
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For each offer made, the condition for whether or not the farmer decides to switch
is the same as before:
If κ > (µx − q) 12τ,then σ∗x = 1
If κ = (µx − q) 12τ , then σ∗x ∈ [0, 1]
If κ < (µx − q) 12τ,then σ∗x = 0
For simplicity, assume that it is equally likely for the market price to take any of
the three values. Let γi denote the probability that type B offers xL, given pi,
and let αi denote the probability that type B offers xM , given pi, i = H,M,L.
Proposition 1*: If the level of competition in the market is low, i.e. κ >
(1− q) 12τ , the bad type does not need to conceal his type. In this situation, im-
proving the farmer’s access to price information will not increase the expected
price that he receives in the first period.
As in the case with two prices, if κ > (1− q) 12τ , the farmer will never switch
and the middleman will always offer xB.
Proposition 2*: For an intermediate level of competition, i.e. (1− q) 12τ >
κ >
q(1−q) 23
q+(1−q) 13
1
2τ , the bad type of middleman will need to disguise his type or else
the farmer will switch to a new trading partner for the second period. For this
level of competition, the expected price that the farmer receives in the first period
will be higher with price information.
If (1− q) 12τ > κ >
q(1−q) 23
q+(1−q) 13
1
2τ , the middleman will always offer xL and
σ∗B = 0
σ∗L = 1
σ∗M = 1
σ∗H = 1
Proposition 3*: As the level of competition in the market increases, the
benefit to the farmer of being informed about the market price decreases.
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Suppose q(1−q)
2
3
q+(1−q) 13
1
2τ > κ >
q(1−q)
2−q
1
2τ .
20 For this value of κ, it is no longer
possible for the bad type to always offer xL, as if he did, then (µL − q)12τ > κ,
and the farmer would switch when he received an offer of xL. Assume γL = 1.21
In order for the middleman to be indifferent between offering xL and xM , the
farmer must sometimes switch when he receives the lower offer. We must have
(µL − q) 12τ = κ, which implies:
γ∗M + γ∗H =
κ
q(1− q)12τ − qκ
As long as κ > q(1−q)2−q
1
2τ , it is not optimal for the farmer to switch when he
receives an offer of xM , even if the middleman never offers xH . Therefore, the
following will be an equilibrium:
α∗M = 1− γ∗M
α∗H = 1− γ∗H
σ∗B = 0
σ∗L =
τ − (pM − pL)
τ
σ∗M = 1
σ∗H = 1
As κ decreases, γ∗M + γ∗H must fall so that the farmer remains indifferent between
switching or staying when he receives an offer of xL. Since α∗M +α∗H = 2− (γ∗M +
γ∗H), α∗M + α∗H must rise. This will happen up until the point where
κ = (µM − q) 12τ
µM =
q(α∗M + α∗H)
q(α∗M + α∗H) + (1− q)
= q(1− q)2− q
1
2τ , since γ
∗
M + γ∗H = κq(1−q) 12 τ−qκmust still hold.
At this point, the middleman must start occasionally offering xH in order for the
farmer to remain indifferent to switching when he receives an offer of xM . We
20This is possible as long as q < 3421As in the case with two prices, this is not the only equilibrium as the middleman is indifferent
between offering xL and xM regardless of the value of the market price. As the expected
payoff to the farmer is the same for all of the equilibria, however, I will focus on this one
for simplicity.
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then have
γ∗M + γ∗H =
κ
q(1− q)12τ − qκ
α∗M + α∗H =
(1− q)κ− q(1− q)12τ
q(1− q)12τ − qκ
σ∗B = 0
σ∗L =
τ − (pH − pL)
τ
σ∗M =
τ − (pM − pL)
τ
σ∗H = 1
As κ decreases, γ∗M + γ∗H and α∗M + α∗H must also decrease, meaning that the
benefit to the farmer of being informed also decreases.
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An Instrument to Measure Interpersonal Orientation 
 
In this task we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another person, 
whom we will refer to simply as the "Other."  This other person is someone you do not know 
and that you will not knowingly meet in the future.  Both you and the "Other" person will be 
making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C.  Your own choices will produce points 
for both yourself and the "Other" person.  Likewise, the other's choice will produce points for 
him/her and for you.  Every point has value: the more points you receive, the better for you, 
and the more points the "Other" receives, the better for him/her. 
 
Here's an example of how this task works: 
     A   B   C 
You get  500  500  550 
Other gets  100  500  300 
 
In this example, if you choose A you would receive 500 points and the other would receive 
100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500; and if you chose 
C, you would receive 550 points and the other 300.  So, you see that your choice influences 
both the number of points you receive and the number of points the other receives.  Before 
you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers -- 
choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most.  Also, remember that the points 
have value:  the more of them you accumulate the better for you.  Likewise, from the 
"other's" point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the better for him/her. 
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Chapter 2
Quality Observability and Vertical Integration in
Supply Chains
2.1 Introduction
A low level of production of high-quality agricultural goods is a major problem for
many developing countries. The World Development Report 2008, Agriculture for
Development, highlighted the opportunities for farmers to increase their profits
by supplying rapidly growing urban and export markets which demand goods of
higher quality. In addition, the availability of better-quality food products which
are more hygienic and higher in nutritional value could lead to improved health
outcomes for consumers. This paper will investigate the relationship between the
decision to produce high-quality goods and two important characteristics of the
product: the degree of observability of quality and the level of intermediation in
the supply chain.
Supply chains for agricultural goods in most developed countries are charac-
terised by a high level of integration. Farmers generally sell directly to processors
or through agricultural cooperatives. Supply chains in many developing coun-
tries, on the other hand, tend to involve a large number of intermediaries, such
as collectors, middlemen or brokers, who perform a variety of functions. It is
possible that this higher level of intermediation could lead to a lower level of pro-
duction of high-quality goods, especially if each actor in the supply chain must
exert effort in order to maintain the quality of the good.
Not all quality attributes are easily observable and in some cases it is necessary
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to carry out tests in order to know whether or not a good is of high quality. A
middleman may be unwilling to pay a farmer a high price for a good that may not
be of high quality, especially if the effort of the farmer is also not observable and
so a moral hazard problem exists. Moral hazard is not a problem in this situation
if the quality of the good is perfectly observable as then the middleman can just
pay the farmer a higher price when he successfully produces a high-quality good.
However, if the quality of the good is not perfectly observable, in some cases
the farmer may receive a high price even when he did not exert high effort and
the good is of low quality. This means that if he is to exert effort, his incentive
to produce high-quality goods must be increased by offering him a higher price
for goods that appear to be of higher quality, thereby increasing the cost to the
middleman. A middleman may also be unwilling to exert the necessary effort to
maintain the quality of the good if he is not certain that it is of high quality.
Vertical integration could overcome some of these problems.
This paper will present a model of a supply chain for a good involving two
stages of production. Effort must be exerted at both stages if a high-quality good
is to be produced. Effort is not observable and the quality of the good is not
perfectly observable. The model predicts that there will be a range of values of the
price difference between high-quality and low-quality goods for which production
of high-quality goods will occur with vertical integration but will not occur if the
tasks are carried out by separate agents. The range of price values for which this
occurs will be decreasing as the level of observability of quality increases and will
disappear as quality becomes perfectly observable. The paper will also present
some case studies of supply chains for various products in a number of developing
countries that have characteristics which are consistent with the predictions of
the model.
Much of the existing literature related to quality focuses on the use of reputa-
tion to incentivise firms to produce goods of high quality. These papers describe
models where consumers cannot immediately observe the quality of the good that
they purchase but once they consume the good they learn the quality and they
are able to punish firms who produce goods of lower quality than stated by refus-
ing to buy from them in the future. Firms receive a price premium for producing
high-quality goods.1 Dana and Fong (2011) present a model which predicts that
concern about loss of reputation can lead firms to produce higher-quality goods
in oligopolistic markets but not monopolistic or competitive markets. Kranton
(2003) argues that competition can eliminate the price premium for reputation
1Shapiro (1983); Allen (1984); Riordan (1986); Gale and Rosenthal (1994).
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needed to induce production of high quality. Esfahani (1989) argues that it is
harder for reputation to sustain a high-quality equilibrium in developing countries
because of the high rate of seller turnover, high idiosyncratic cost fluctuations and
low entry costs.
Fafchamps, Vargas-Hill and Minten (2007) also suggest that reputation and
repeated interaction cannot overcome the problem of poor quality in developing
countries because producers are very far removed from consumers because of
the large number of actors in the supply chain. They investigate the extent to
which information about crop attributes is conveyed along the supply chain by
examining evidence from supply chains for non-staple food crops in India. They
find that while price premiums exist for observable product characteristics, no
information is circulated about unobservable characteristics. As a result, growers
have no incentive to invest in unobservable quality characteristics. This paper
will abstract away from the question of reputation and focus on a situation where
it is not possible for repeated purchases to act as an incentive for producing
high-quality goods. It will demonstrate how, even in the absence of reputational
concerns, vertical integration could lead to increased production of higher-quality
goods.
A number of other papers have also discussed the issue of low-quality agri-
cultural goods in developing countries. Robinson and Kolavalli (2010) describe
the problems involved in maintaining quality in tomato markets in Ghana. They
state that sales are based on quantity rather than quality. Quality can be difficult
to assess as farmers often put poor-quality tomatoes on the bottom of the crate
and better-quality tomatoes on the top. Middlemen exacerbate this problem
by stacking crates on top of each other thereby further reducing the quality of
tomatoes at the bottom of the crate. Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin discuss the
problem of assessing quality in agricultural markets in Benin. They report that
inspecting quality is challenging and time consuming and traders do not want to
delegate this task to others. This increases their costs and limits their ability to
expand their operations.
This paper adds to the literature by presenting a model where effort needs to
be exerted at each stage in the production process in order to maintain quality.
This set-up is similar in spirit to Kremer’s O-Ring theory.2 The model presented
in this paper does not allow for heterogeneity in levels of skill, however. Instead,
it investigates how the degree of observability of quality affects the decision of
2Kremer (1993).
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agents later in the chain about whether or not to exert effort.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model. Characteristics of a number of supply chains which are consistent with the
predictions of the model are presented in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Description of economic environment
I will describe the supply chain of a good which involves two stages of production.
I will use the example of a farmer and middleman in this paper but this model
could apply to a number of other situations. There are two possible quality
levels that the good can have, high or low, Q ∈ {H,L}. The final market price
for a high-quality good is pH and the price for a low-quality good is pL. The
quality of the good is perfectly observable to the final purchaser (e.g. a large
processing company who has the technology to test for quality) but it is not
perfectly observable at the intermediate production stage. A higher level of effort
is required at both stages of the production process in order to produce a good
of high quality. This effort is costly. The timing of the production process is as
follows:
1. The decision is made about whether or not to exert high effort in the first
stage of production. The cost of this effort is cF . If high effort is exerted,
the probability that the good that is produced will be of high quality is γ.
If low effort is exerted, the good will be of low quality with certainty.
2. A signal, s ∈ {H,L}, regarding the quality of the good is received. s = Q
with probability ρ, 1 ≥ ρ > 12 . ρ gives us a measure of the observability
of quality. If ρ is close to 12 , then it is very difficult to observe quality. If
ρ = 1, then quality is perfectly observable.
3. The decision is made about whether or not to exert high effort in the second
stage of production in order to maintain the quality of the good. The cost
of this effort is cM . If effort is exerted at this stage, the quality of the good
will be preserved with certainty. If effort is not exerted, the quality of the
good will be low.
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4. The quality of the good is perfectly observed in the final stage and pH will
be received for the good if Q = H and pL will be received if Q = L.
The following sections will present the predictions of the model both for the case
where each stage of production is carried out by a separate agent and for the
vertically integrated case where one agent carries out both tasks.
2.2.2 Separate agents
Suppose there are two agents, a farmer and a middleman. Both agents are as-
sumed to be risk neutral. The farmer carries out the first stage of production
and the middleman carries out the second stage. The middleman cannot observe
the farmer’s effort level and cannot perfectly observe the quality of the good. His
payment to the farmer can therefore only be based on the signal of quality that
he receives. The middleman must decide whether or not to offer the farmer a
contract such that the farmer has an incentive to exert effort.
2.2.2.1 Farmer’s problem
Suppose the farmer receives h from the middleman if s = H and l if s = L. If
the farmer exerts high effort, his expected payoff will be:
γ (ρh+ (1− ρ) l) + (1− γ) ((1− ρ)h+ ρl)− cF
If he does not exert high effort, his expected payoff will be:
(1− ρ)h+ ρl
The farmer will therefore exert effort if
h− l ≥ c
F
(2ρ− 1) γ
I will assume that a limited liability constraint applies so that l ≥ 0. This
assumption is important but not unreasonable. It means that we assume that
the middleman cannot force the farmer to pay him if he receives a low signal.
It is reasonable to assume that the worst that the middleman could do to the
farmer would be to refuse to purchase the good. The farmer must also be willing
to participate in the contract. I will assume that the value of the farmer’s outside
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option is zero. The following condition must hold:
γ [ρh+ (1− ρ) l] + (1− γ) [(1− ρ)h+ ρl]− cF ≥ 0
Given the above constraints, from the point of view of the middleman, the optimal
h and l which will induce the farmer to exert effort will be:
h∗ = c
F
(2ρ− 1) γ
l∗ = 0
2.2.2.2 Middleman’s problem
The middleman has two decisions to make. He must decide whether or not to
exert effort himself in the second stage and he must decide whether or not to
induce the farmer to exert effort in the first stage. His decision about whether
or not to induce the farmer to exert effort will depend on his own willingness to
exert effort in the second stage.
Second Stage
The middleman will only exert effort in the second stage of production if he
believes that effort was exerted in the first stage. If he has set h ≥ h∗ in the first
stage, then he will believe that the farmer exerted effort in the first stage with
probability one. If he has set h < h∗ in the first stage, then he will believe that
the farmer exerted effort in the first stage with probability zero.
In the second stage, a signal will be received about the quality of the good,
which the middleman will use to form his beliefs about quality. If he believes
that no effort was exerted in the first stage then he will believe that the good is
of low quality with probability one, regardless of the signal. If he believes that
effort was exerted in the first stage, then his beliefs about the quality of the good
will be formed as follows:
µH = Prob(Q = H | s = H) = γρ
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
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µL = Prob(Q = H | s = L) = γ (1− ρ)
γ (1− ρ) + (1− γ) ρ
The middleman will then decide whether or not to exert effort. Once he is in
the second stage, the costs from the first stage are sunk, so his decision will only
depend on his belief about the quality of the good, the cost of effort required to
preserve the quality of the good, and the difference between the price for a good
of high quality and that for a good of low quality. Let p˜ = pH − pL.
If the following condition holds, the middleman will exert effort in the second
stage when he receives a signal that the good is of high quality:
p˜ ≥ cM
(
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γρ
)
. (2.1)
He will exert effort in the final stage when he receives a signal that the good is
of low quality if the following condition holds:
p˜ ≥ cM
(
γ (1− ρ) + (1− γ) ρ
γ (1− ρ)
)
. (2.2)
The second condition is stronger so if the middleman is willing to exert effort
when he receives a low signal, he will also be willing to exert effort when he
receives a high signal.
First stage
Given that the middleman knows the choices that he will make in the second
stage if effort is exerted by the farmer, he must use this to decide whether or not
to induce the farmer to exert high effort in the first stage.
Proposition 1: If cM
(
γ(1−ρ)+(1−γ)ρ
γ(1−ρ)
)
≥ p˜ ≥ cM
(
γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)
γρ
)
, the middle-
man will induce the farmer to exert high effort if the following condition holds:
p˜ ≥ γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γρ
(
cF
(2ρ− 1) γ + c
M
)
(2.3)
Otherwise, only low-quality goods will be produced.
For these parameter values, the middleman is only willing to exert effort in the
final stage if he receives a signal that the good is of high quality. Given this, the
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probability of successfully producing a good of high quality is γρ. He will only
be willing to induce the farmer to exert high effort if his expected gain is greater
than the expected cost that he will have to pay. The middleman will only pay h
and cM if a high signal is received.
Proposition 2: If p˜ ≥ cM
(
γ(1−ρ)+(1−γ)ρ
γ(1−ρ)
)
, the middleman will induce the
farmer to exert high effort if the following condition holds:
p˜ ≥ γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γ
(
cF
(2ρ− 1) γ
)
+ c
M
γ
(2.4)
Otherwise, only low-quality goods will be produced.
In this case, p˜ is large enough relative to cM that the middleman will always
be willing to exert effort in the second stage if effort has been exerted in the
first stage, regardless of the value of the signal that he receives. Given this, the
probability of producing a good of high quality is now γ. In this case, however,
the middleman will always pay cM .
The middleman’s decision regarding the level of effort to exert will therefore
depend on the relative parameter values. The possible effort levels that the
middleman could choose are as follows:
1. Full effort: the middleman induces the farmer to exert high effort and always
exerts effort himself.
2. Partial effort: the middleman induces the farmer to exert high effort and
exerts effort himself when he receives a high signal.
3. No effort: the middleman does not induce the farmer to exert high effort
and the farmer always produces low-quality goods.
Proposition 3: Suppose cM
cF
≥ γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)γ
(
1−ρ
(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
)
. If p˜ is such that
Constraint 2.3 is not satisfied, no effort will be exerted. If p˜ is such that Con-
straint 2.3 is satisfied but Constraint 2.2 is not satisfied, then partial effort will
be exerted. If Constraint 2.2 is satisfied, then full effort will be exerted.
If cM
cF
≥ γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)γ
(
1−ρ
(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
)
, then cM is relatively more important than
cF . This means that the middleman will be willing to induce the farmer to exert
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high effort at values of p˜ which are lower than the value at which he himself would
be willing to exert full effort. In this scenario,
cM
(
γ (1− ρ) + (1− γ) ρ
γ (1− ρ)
)
>
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γ
(
cF
(2ρ− 1) γ
)
+ c
M
γ
>
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γρ
(
cF
(2ρ− 1) γ + c
M
)
> cM
(
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γρ
)
,
which means that Constraint 2.2 is the hardest constraint to satisfy. Once this
has been satisfied, full effort will be exerted and the high quality good will be
produced with probability γ.
Proposition 4: Suppose cM
cF
< γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)γ
(
1−ρ
(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
)
. If Constraint 2.4
is not satisfied, no effort will be exerted. If Constraint 2.4 is satisfied, then full
effort will be exerted.
If cM
cF
< γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)γ
(
1−ρ
(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
)
, then cF is relatively more important than
cM . The middleman would always be willing to incur cM in the final stage (condi-
tional on effort being exerted in the first stage) at values of p˜ which are lower than
the value at which he is willing to pay enough to induce the farmer to exert high
effort. This means that Constraints 2.2 and 2.4 will be satisfied more easily than
Constraint 2.3 and therefore partial effort will never be exerted in this case.
2.2.3 Vertically integrated firm
Now, suppose there is just one agent who carries out both tasks. As with the
case with two agents, his decision about whether or not to exert effort in the first
stage will depend on his willingness to exert effort in the second stage.
2.2.3.1 Second stage
The agent will know whether or not he exerted effort in the first stage. If he
did not exert effort in the first stage then he will not exert effort in the second
stage as he knows that the good is of low quality. If he did exert effort in the
first stage, then his decision to exert effort in the second stage will depend on
his beliefs regarding the quality of the good. These beliefs will be formed based
on the signal that he receives in the same way that the beliefs were formed by
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the middleman in the case with two agents. He will exert effort in the second
stage when he receives a signal that the good is of high quality if Constraint 2.1
is satisfied and will exert effort when he receives a signal that the good is of low
quality if Constraint 2.2 is satisfied.
2.2.3.2 First stage
The conditions that need to be satisfied in order for effort to be exerted in the
first stage will be different from the case with two agents, as there will no longer
be a moral hazard problem.
Proposition 5: If cM
(
γ(1−ρ)+(1−γ)ρ
γ(1−ρ)
)
≥ p˜ ≥ cM
(
γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)
γρ
)
, the agent will
exert effort in the first stage if the following condition holds:
p˜ ≥ c
F
γρ
+
(
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γρ
)
cM (2.5)
Otherwise, only low-quality goods will be produced.
As in the case with two agents, for this value of p˜, the agent is only willing
to exert effort in the second stage if he receives a high signal. The probability of
success will therefore be γρ. The cost that he has to pay for effort to be exerted
in the first stage is now smaller, however, as he does not have to pay a premium
to overcome the moral hazard problem.
Proposition 6: If p˜ ≥ cM
(
γ(1−ρ)+(1−γ)ρ
γ(1−ρ)
)
, the agent will exert effort in the
first stage if the following condition holds:
p˜ ≥ c
F + cM
γ
(2.6)
Otherwise, only low-quality goods will be produced.
In this case, the agent is always willing to exert effort in the second stage if
effort is exerted in the first stage. Therefore, it is as if there is just one task to
be carried out and the cost is cF + cM . The probability of success will be γ.
The agent again must choose between three possible effort levels: full effort,
partial effort and no effort.
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Proposition 7: Suppose cM
cF
≥ 1−ρ(2ρ−1)(1−γ) . If p˜ is such that Constraint 2.5 is
not satisfied, no effort will be exerted. If p˜ is such that Constraint 2.5 is satisfied
but Constraint 2.2 is not satisfied, then partial effort will be exerted. If Constraint
2.2 is satisfied, then full effort will be exerted.
This situation is comparable to that in Proposition 3. The condition on the
parameter values is different, however. As γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)γ
(
1−ρ
(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
)
> 1−ρ(2ρ−1)(1−γ) ,
this situation will apply for a lower value of cM
cF
than in the case with two agents.
This is because the actual cost of making sure that effort is exerted in the first
stage is greater in the case with two agents.
Proposition 8: Suppose cM
cF
< 1−ρ(2ρ−1)(1−γ) . If p˜ is such that Constraint 2.6
is not satisfied, then no effort will be exerted. If p˜ is such that Constraint 2.6 is
satisfied then full effort will be exerted.
In this situation, cF is relatively more important and so either no effort will be
exerted or full effort will be exerted. This is comparable to Proposition 4 in the
two agent case but again the constraint necessary for high-quality production to
take place is easier to satisfy in this case.
2.2.4 Comparison of two agent case with vertical integration
2.2.4.1 Case 1: cM
cF
≥ γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)γ
(
1−ρ
(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
)
> 1−ρ(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
For low values of p˜, no effort will be exerted with or without integration. As p˜
increases, we will hit the partial effort constraint. This happens for lower values
of p˜ in the integrated case than in the two-agent case, as
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γρ
(
cF
(2ρ− 1) γ + c
M
)
≥ c
F
γρ
+
(
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γρ
)
cM
If p˜ lies between these values, high-quality goods will not be produced in the
two-agent case but will be produced in the integrated case. From now on I will
refer to this range of value of p˜ as the ‘production gap’. Once p˜ becomes greater
than cM
(
γ(1−ρ)+(1−γ)ρ
γ(1−ρ)
)
, full effort will be exerted regardless of the structure of
the supply chain.
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2.2.4.2 Case 2: γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)γ
(
1−ρ
(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
)
> c
M
cF
≥ 1−ρ(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
For these parameter values, the agent will be willing to exert partial effort for
some values of the price in the integrated case but not in the two-agent case. If
the following is true
cM
(
γ (1− ρ) + (1− γ) ρ
γ (1− ρ)
)
> p˜ ≥ c
F
γρ
+
(
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γρ
)
cM
partial effort will be exerted in the integrated case but no effort will be exerted
in the two-agent case. As p˜ increases, we will reach the following situation:
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γ
(
cF
(2ρ− 1) γ
)
+ c
M
γ
> p˜ ≥ cM
(
γ (1− ρ) + (1− γ) ρ
γ (1− ρ)
)
where full effort will be exerted in the integrated case but still no effort will be
exerted in the two-agent case. Once p˜ becomes large enough that it is greater than
γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)
γ
(
cF
(2ρ−1)γ
)
+ cM
γ
, full effort will be exerted in the two-agent case.
2.2.4.3 Case 3: γρ+(1−γ)(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)γ
(
1−ρ
(2ρ−1)(1−γ)
)
> 1−ρ(2ρ−1)(1−γ) ≥ c
M
cF
For these parameter values, partial effort is never exerted so we only need to
compare the conditions for full effort to be exerted. As before, this condition will
be satisfied for lower values of p˜ in the integrated case than in the two-agent case,
as
γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ)
γ
(
cF
(2ρ− 1) γ
)
+ c
M
γ
≥ c
F + cM
γ
If p˜ lies between these values then high-quality goods will be produced in the
integrated case but not in the two-agent case.
2.2.5 Comparative Statics
2.2.5.1 Degree of observability, ρ
As ρ increases, the range of values of p˜ over which it is profitable to produce at
all increases. However, as the price that the middleman must pay to the farmer
in the two-agent case is decreasing in ρ, this range of values increases faster in
the two-agent case than in the integrated case and therefore the production gap
becomes smaller.
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For a given cM
cF
, if ρ is small we will be in Case 3 above where only full effort
or no effort will be exerted. The production gap will be equal to:
1− ρ
γ2 (2ρ− 1)c
F
which is decreasing in ρ. As ρ continues to increase, we will move to Case 2, where
partial effort will be exerted for some values of p˜. In this case the production gap
will be equal to[
ρ (γρ+ (1− γ) (1− ρ))− γ (2ρ− 1)
γ2ρ (2ρ− 1)
]
cF + (2ρ− 1) (1− γ)
γρ
cM
Since in this case cM
cF
< 1−ρ(2ρ−1)(1−γ) , this gap will be smaller than when we were
in Case 3 and will still be decreasing in ρ. Eventually we will move to Case 1,
where the production gap will be equal to:
1− ρ
γ2ρ (2ρ− 1)c
F
Again, given the value of ρ in this case, this gap will be smaller than in the
previous case and will continue to decrease as ρ increases. If ρ = 1, the difference
will disappear and there will be no loss in efficiency from not having an integrated
supply chain.
2.2.5.2 The middleman’s cost, cM
For a given ρ and cF , if cM is sufficiently high we will be in Case 1 above. As long
as we remain in this case, the production gap will remain constant as cM falls.
However, eventually cM will become small enough that we will move to Case 2,
where for this range of parameter values, the gap will be smaller than it was in
Case 1. Also, the gap will now depend on cM and will continue to fall as cM falls.
Finally, if cM continues to fall, we will move to Case 3. Once again, in this case
the size of the gap will be smaller than in the previous cases. It will no longer
depend on cM , however, so it will remain constant from now on as cM falls.
2.2.5.3 The farmer’s cost, cF
As with cM and ρ, as cF falls, the production gap falls. For a given cM and ρ, if
cF is high, we will be in Case 3. As cF falls we will move from Case 3 to Case
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2 and eventually to Case 1. In each successive case, the production gap will be
smaller and within each of these cases it will be decreasing in cF . As cF goes to
zero, the production gap will also go to zero.
2.2.6 Summary of findings
The decision to produce high-quality goods will depend on the costs of production,
the degree of observability of quality and the price difference between goods of
high and low quality. If quality is not perfectly observable, it is more costly to
the middleman to overcome the problem of the farmer’s moral hazard. He will
therefore need a larger price difference between high- and low-quality goods in
order to convince him to induce effort in the farmer and exert effort himself. The
lack of observability of quality increases the cost of production of high-quality
goods in the first stage when the two stages are carried out by different agents
but not in the vertically integrated case. This creates a ‘production gap’ as there
is a range of values of the price difference between high- and low-quality goods
for which high-quality goods are produced in the vertically integrated case but
not in the case with two agents. In addition to increasing the first-stage cost of
producing high-quality goods, a lower ρ also decreases the likelihood that partial
effort will be exerted as this will only happen when the expected cost paid to the
farmer is low relative to cM . This also increases the production gap.
2.3 Empirical Observations
This section will discuss the structure of supply chains for a number of different
products. It will present two examples of products where the degree of observ-
ability of quality is low: milk and cocoa. It will also present two examples of
products with a higher degree of observable quality: chilli and rice. In the case
of the first two products, we will see that high-quality goods are only produced
in situations where the supply chain is short. However, in the second two cases,
we will see that it is possible to produce higher-quality products even when there
is a high degree of intermediation in the supply chain.
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2.3.1 Milk
There is a significant difference between the structure of dairy supply chains in
developed countries and those in a number of developing countries. In developed
countries, the supply chain for dairy tends to be very short. Most milk is produced
through cooperatives who deliver the milk directly to a processor. Farmers who do
not sell their milk through cooperatives sell directly to processors themselves. The
milk that is produced is rigorously tested and of high quality.3 In the case of the
developing countries discussed in this section, the situation is quite different. The
supply chain for milk in these countries involves many actors and is plagued by
problems of low quality. The vast majority of milk that is sold is raw, unprocessed
milk which must be boiled before use and is often adulterated with water.4 A
report by TechnoServe Rwanda (2008) estimates that 96% of milk marketed in
Rwanda is through the informal channel even though the price of processed milk is
2-2.5 times that of fresh raw milk. A similar situation can be found in Pakistan:
Dairying in Pakistan is labour-intensive and engages a large number
of agents along the value chain, including 6.8 million farmers, and
thousands of milk collectors, transporters, processors, distributors and
retailers. ... In the absence of checks and balances, adulteration is
rampant, as each agent in the marketing chain seeks to maximize
profits. (Zia, Mahmood and Ali, 2011; p. 10-11)
Much of the adulteration is attributed to intermediaries in the chain who try to
keep the milk cool during transport by adding ice or who add washing powder and
maize flour to try and enhance volume and whiteness. Adulteration by farmers
is also common as they try to increase the volume by adding water since milk
tends to be bought on the basis of quantity rather than quality.5
Observing the quality of milk can be very challenging. A basic level of quality
in milk can be observed by sight, smell and taste but testing for most of the
characteristics of high-quality milk, such as the presence of bacteria and fat con-
tent, involves more sophisticated equipment and cannot be carried out by local
middlemen.6
3Smith and Thanassoulis (2008) and DairyCo (2011).
4Faye and Loiseau (2002) and SNV Netherlands Development Organisation (2008).
5Zia, Mahmood and Ali (2011).
6Kibiego (2010).
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According to a report by the SNV Netherlands Development Organisation
(2008):
The present system in Ethiopia for testing of raw milk and dairy
products (with the exception of some research testing laboratories like
ILRI) does not stimulate the production of good quality, biologically
pure milk with high technological quality that meets the national/
international standards. Currently there are no proper means for
collecting and processing of information concerning the milk and milk
products quality for marketing. (p. v)
In terms of the model presented in the previous section, this would correspond
to a very low value of ρ. In addition to the low level of observability of quality,
it is costly for middlemen to try and preserve the quality of milk during trans-
portation as the handling and storage of the milk must be carried out with care
in order to prevent contamination. The milk can be contaminated by storage
material that has not been properly disinfected or by transporting the milk for
too long without proper cooling equipment.7 Rota and Sperandini (2010) report
that transportation and handling costs make up the largest portion of marketing
costs of fresh milk. The combination of high costs to the middleman and low ob-
servability of quality means that middlemen have little incentive to pay farmers
a higher price in order to encourage them to produce higher-quality milk.
This is not to suggest that no high-quality milk is produced in these countries.
In general, however, the value chain for high-quality milk is much shorter and
looks more like the supply chains for dairy that we see in developed countries.
In Pakistan, there are a number of formal processors who produce processed,
fresh milk. They usually buy milk directly from farmers rather than through
middlemen and they provide the transport themselves using refrigerated tanks.
They have also set up farm cooling tanks in the villages where they collect the
milk.8
In Ethiopia, the Adaa Dairy Cooperative which has 813 members has managed
to start producing higher-quality milk which is then delivered directly to one of
12 collection points where the milk is tested for quality.9 TechnoServe Rwanda
(2008) reports a similar situation in Rwanda where a number of farmers in the
region around Kigali are vertically integrated into the dairy market and many of
7Faye and Loiseau (2002) and SNV Netherlands Development Organisation (2008).
8Zia, Mahmood and Ali (2011).
9SNV Netherlands Development Organisation (2008).
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the owners of dairy farms also own a processor or retailer.
Finally, much of the production of high-quality milk in developing countries is
supported by large multi-national corporations, such as Nestlé, who work directly
with farmers to source the milk and provide the necessary infrastructure for
safely transporting the milk without it being contaminated. In addition, these
companies provide training to farmers to help them improve their production
techniques so that they can produce high-quality milk.10
2.3.2 Cocoa
This section will compare the structure of the supply chain for cocoa in two major
cocoa producing countries: Indonesia and Ghana. The quality of cocoa produced
in Indonesia is generally quite poor. In contrast, Ghana has a reputation for
producing high-quality cocoa. The supply chains for cocoa in these two countries
have quite different structures. There are many actors involved in the supply
chain for cocoa in Indonesia. Farmers generally sell to local collectors at the
farm gate who then sell on to village collectors who sell to processors or other
intermediaries.
The supply chain in Ghana is much shorter. The cocoa industry in Ghana is
strictly regulated by the Cocoa Marketing Board, Cocobod. Farmers either sell
directly to Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) or to farmers’ associations, both
of whom sell directly to Cocobod.
Observing the quality of cocoa beans is not quite as difficult as in the case of
milk but it still poses a number of challenges. In order to meet international stan-
dards, high-quality cocoa beans should possess the following characteristics:
Cocoa beans of good quality are free from insect holes, smoky and
flat beans. They are not excessively acidic, bitter or astringent, and
they have uniform sizes. They should also be well fermented, have a
moisture content of maximum 7.5 %, a free fatty acid content maxi-
mum 1.5 % and a cocoa butter content between 45 and 60 %. Finally,
too high levels of foreign matters, insects, harmful bacteria and pesti-
cides residues are not allowed ... International standards are made to
measure quality of cocoa beans. This is performed via a cut test where
the cocoa beans are cut lengthwise and visually divided after quality.
10Zia, Mahmood and Ali (2011) and http://www.nestle.com/Brands/Dairy/Pages/DairyCSV.aspx
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Purple beans, slaty beans and beans with all other defectiveness are
grouped. Defectiveness among cocoa beans includes flat, moldy and
germinated beans” (Mikkelsen, 2010; p.19)
Mikkelsen (2010) outlines the steps involved in identifying and handling high-
quality beans. Many of the problems with the cocoa beans can be detected
by sight via a cut test. However, to ensure that the batch of cocoa beans is
generally of good quality, this must be carried out with a significant sample of the
beans which is time-consuming. In addition, specialised equipment is necessary
to measure the moisture content of the beans and a sample of the beans must be
weighed and counted in order to determine bean size.
If the middleman is willing to buy high-quality beans, then he must exert effort
in order to maintain the quality of the beans. High-quality cocoa beans must be
stored with care in order to preserve quality. Sacks must be secure and tight to
protect from insect infestation. They also need to be kept dry and protected from
high temperatures.11 Most importantly, they should not be mixed with beans of
lower quality.
Cocoa beans in Indonesia are generally purchased on the basis of quantity
rather than quality. Collectors do not differentiate on the basis of quality in
terms of the price that they pay the farmer. In addition, they mix beans of
different quality with each other and sometimes also with waste material in an
effort to increase volume:12
The common practice has been for the first buyer (local collector)
to pay the same price per kilogram for both good and poor quality
cocoa, ‘mixing’ the beans and forwarding these mixed beans on to the
next buyer (village collector). When the cocoa beans eventually arrive
at the warehouse of the international exporter they then need to be
cleaned or ‘unmixed’ to meet the international buyer’s specifications.
(Badcock, Matlick, and Bako Baon, 2007; p. 3).
There are a number of actions that farmers can take in order to produce high-
quality cocoa beans. A major cause of low quality in cocoa beans is infestation
by the cocoa pod borer. The farmer could exert effort to protect his crops from
infestation. He could also improve the quality of his beans by fermenting them.
However, these actions are costly for the farmer and he has no incentive to carry
11Mikkelsen (2010).
12Panlibuton, Henry, and Lusby (2006).
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them out as the collector is not willing to pay a higher price for beans that appear
to be of higher quality.
In general, there is little cooperation between cocoa farmers in Indonesia, and
associations or cooperatives do not exist. A few local processors have begun to
set up ‘up-country’ buying stations in order to try and source high-quality beans
directly from farmers.13 A number of international organisations have also started
to work directly with farmers in order to increase the level of quality in the beans
that they purchase. Armajaro and Olam have both established buying stations
that are located close to farmers where quality control is carried out and farmers
are paid a premium for high-quality beans.14
Cocoa production in Ghana follows a very different model which is focused on
producing high-quality cocoa beans. The cocoa marketing board in Ghana (Co-
cobod) plays a major role in ensuring that the quality of cocoa is high. Farmers
either sell cocoa to Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) or farmer associations.15
Cocoa is strictly graded and checked for quality at a number of stages in the
chain. Low-quality cocoa is rejected by Cocobod, providing a strong incentive to
the LBCs to perform quality checks at an early stage in the supply chain:
Because cocoa is graded early in the marketing chain and identi-
fied by farming society, farmers are motivated to present high quality
cocoa and are also instantly aware (and penalised, by not being able
to sell their cocoa) when their cocoa is sub standard (Shepherd and
Onumah 1997: 46; Bank of Ghana 2003: 10). By contrast, in other
cocoa producing countries cocoa is generally graded much later in the
chain and not always traced back to its origin, giving farmers little
information about their cocoa’s quality and few incentives to improve
it. (Williams, 2009; p. 25)
As was the case with the dairy supply chain we only see high-quality goods being
produced when the supply chain is highly integrated.
13Panlibuton, Henry, and Lusby (2006).
14Badcock, Matlick, and Bako Baon (2007) and VECO (2011).
15Mohammed, Asamoah, and Asiedu-Appiah (2012).
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2.3.3 Chillies
This section will discuss the supply chain for chilli in Indonesia. As was the case
for cocoa, the supply chain for chilli involves a number of different actors: local
collectors, wholesalers, retailers, supermarkets. However, in the case of chilli,
quality is much more easily observable. Most of the characteristics of chilli that
differentiate quality can be judged by sight such as size, shape and colour.
In South Sulawesi in Eastern Indonesia, two main types of chilli are produced:
large chilli and small chilli. Large chilli is considered to be of higher quality and
sells for a higher price. However, the production of large chilli is also more costly.
Different inputs and techniques are used:
In South Sulawesi there are a number of key differences between
small chilli and Large chilli producers: Small chilli producers do not
use high quality certified seed, whereas farmers in the same province
producing Large chilli are using certified seed. The use of certified
seed is used due to stronger market demand and greater intensity of
cultivation. Small chilli cultivation appears to be less intensive and
uses less chemical inputs compared to large chilli farming. (White,
Morey, Natawidjaja, and Morgan, 2007; p.26)
Collectors and wholesalers must also exert some effort to sell high-quality chilli
to supermarkets such as sorting, grading and packaging the chilli.
Even though the supply chain for large chilli is quite long, there is a market
for it. Large chilli is produced and farmers receive a higher price for producing
it. In 2005, 62% of chilli production was large chilli and 38% was small chilli.16
The most common form of supply chain for chilli in Indonesia is for farmers to
sell to local collectors who then sell to wholesalers or retailers. The wholesalers
may sell to small retailers or to supermarkets. Collectors pay a higher price for
higher-quality chilli.
An exception to the long supply chain is the case of chillies produced to make
chilli sauce. ABC is a processor of chilli sauce in Indonesia and buys at least
half of its chilli directly from growers. The company needs the farmers to grow
a particular variety of chilli in order for it to have the right flavour, which is a
characteristic that is more difficult to observe than the size of the chilli.
16White, Morey, Natawidjaja, and Morgan (2007).
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2.3.4 Rice
The final product that will be discussed is rice. This section will describe the
production of rice in Vietnam and Thailand. In both of these countries many
actors are involved in the supply chain for rice: producers, assemblers, middle-
men/brokers, wholesalers, millers/polishers and retailers. Similarly to the case of
chilli, the quality characteristics of rice are easily observable:
In general, there is a broad range of rice qualities available in the
market place in the Mekong River Delta, Vietnam. The difference in
the qualities are based on the rice variety, the way of milling the rice
influences to what extent the grains are broken (broken level), the
period the rice has been in storage, and the purity of the rice. (Hai,
2002; p.82)
Most rice traders in Vietnam differentiate rice into two types, long and medium/
short. Long-grain rice is higher quality and the growers receive a higher price. Of
paddy sold at the farm gate in the Mekong Delta, approximately 60% is long grain
paddy and 40% is short grain. In Thailand, two types of rice are also produced:
glutinous and non-glutinous. Non-glutinous rice is of higher quality and growers
receive a higher price from traders for this type of rice but must also use more
intensive technology in order to produce it.17 Glutinous rice is grown for own
consumption or sold locally and non-glutinous rice is grown commercially.
We can see that in the case of chilli and rice, where quality characteristics are
easily observable, high-quality products are produced even where there are many
agents participating in the supply chain.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper presented a model of a supply chain which demonstrated that the
decision to produce low-quality goods can be explained by a combination of low
observability of quality and a high level of intermediation in the supply chain.
The model predicts that if the quality of the good is not perfectly observable,
then a ‘production gap’ will exist. This means that there will be a range of
values for the price difference between high- and low-quality goods for which
high-quality goods will be produced if the supply chain is vertically integrated,
17Agrifood Consulting International (2005).
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but will not be produced if the different tasks are performed by separate agents.
The paper also discussed examples of supply chains in a number of developing
countries that have characteristics which are consistent with the predictions of
the model. The analysis in this paper has taken the degree of integration of
the supply chain as exogenous in order to better understand one side of the
problem. In reality, the decision of whether or not to vertically integrate may be
endogenous. Incorporating this into the model could be an important avenue for
future research.
The model presented in this paper predicts that the size of the production
gap will be decreasing in the degree of observability of quality and increasing
in the cost to the farmer of producing a high-quality good and the cost to the
middleman of preserving the quality of the good. This means that, from a policy
perspective, there are a number of ways in which the production of high-quality
goods could be encouraged. Firstly, the government could support the formation
of farmers’ associations which could perform some of the tasks of the middleman
by transporting the goods to the processor. Secondly, processors could be encour-
aged to establish operations ‘up country’ in order to buy directly from farmers
and test for quality earlier in the supply chain. Thirdly, the costs to farmers
could be reduced by training them to use more efficient production techniques
or, once again, by encouraging farmers to work together in a cooperative in order
to reduce costs. Finally, investing in better roads could reduce the middleman’s
costs and the cost to the farmer of sourcing inputs.
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Chapter 3
A Cross-Country Analysis of the Diffusion of
Information and Communications Technology
3.1 Introduction
The potential of information and communications technology for development
has received a lot of attention in recent years. While there is no doubt that mo-
bile phones and the Internet are extremely useful in developed countries, these
technologies are arguably even more important in developing countries where the
information environment is generally poorer and older communications technolo-
gies, such as fixed line telephones, are less widely available. A number of studies
have shown that ICTs can have a significant impact on the well-being of individ-
uals in developing countries.1 These technologies can reduce transaction costs,
help markets to work more efficiently and provide access to important services,
e.g., healthcare information and mobile banking.
However, while there has been rapid growth in the use of mobile phones and
the Internet in developing countries over the past few years, a significant digital
divide still exists, meaning that large portions of the population do not have
access to technologies that could be very beneficial to them. Given the potential
benefits of these technologies, it is important for us to try and understand what
the main barriers to adoption are for developing countries.
The technology adoption process is made up of two parts. Firstly, the necessary
infrastructure must be in place before anyone can use the technology. This usually
1Jensen (2007); Goyal (2010); Aker (2010).
79
involves a significant level of investment. The costs and benefits of this investment
may depend on a number of factors including the physical geography of the region
and the institutional environment. Secondly, individuals can choose whether or
not to use the technology once it is available. This choice will depend on their
economic circumstances and the expected gain to using the technology.
A number of studies have investigated the process of diffusion of ICTs and
its relationship with a number of other variables. Many of these studies focus
on particular countries or geographic areas, such as the EU or OECD.2 The ev-
idence on the relationship between rates of ICT use and income per capita is
mixed. Some studies have found a positive relationship3 while others have found
no significant relationship between the two.4 Previous studies have also come
to different conclusions regarding the relationship between fixed line telephones
and rates of ICT use. Some have found them to be complements5 while others
have found that they are substitutes.6 A number of studies have investigated the
relationship between competition in the mobile phone market and rates of mobile
phone use and have generally found that increased competition leads to higher
rates of mobile phone use.7 Rouvinen (2006) differentiates between developed
and developing countries to investigate whether or not there is a significant dif-
ference in the process of diffusion in poorer countries. He finds that the speed of
adjustment is not too different between developed and developing countries but
that population size and network effects are more important in poorer countries.
Gumboa and Otero (2009) attribute the delayed installation of infrastructure in
remote areas of Columbia to the diverse topography of the country. Hyytinen
and Toivanenn (2011) find a positive relationship between inequality and mobile
phone penetration rates.
This paper will add to this literature by using a logistic model of technology
diffusion to investigate the relationship between rates of mobile phone and Inter-
net use and a number of geographic, institutional and economic variables, in a
sample of 164 countries from 1990 to 2009. The aim of this paper is to identify
the main characteristics of countries that have had success in adopting these new
technologies in order to gain some insight into the barriers which may be faced
2Gruber and Verboven (2000); Lee and Cho (2007); Frank (2004); Jang, Dai and Sung (2005).
3Lee and Cho (2007); Ding, Haynes and Li (2010); Bohlin, Gruber and Koutroumpis (2010);
Lee, Marcu and Lee (2011); Gruber and Verboven (2001); Frank (2002).
4Rouvinen (2006); Chu, Wu, Kao and Yen (2009).
5Hwang, Cho and Long (2009); Gruber and Verboven (2001).
6Lee and Cho (2007); Jang, Dai and Sung (2005); Chu, Wu, Kao and Yen (2009).
7Koshi and Kretschmer (2005); Gruber and Verboven (2000); Bohlin, Gruber and Koutroumpis
(2010); Lee, Marcu and Lee (2011); Gruber and Verboven (2001); Jang, Dai and Sung (2005);
Chu, Wu, Kao and Yen (2009); Hwang, Cho and Long (2009).
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by those countries that have been less successful.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the logistic
model of technology diffusion. Section 3 describes the econometric specification
and data used. The results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model of technology diffusion
3.2.1 Model
This section will present a logistic model of technology diffusion, as used by
Gruber and Verboven (2001). Let yit be the number of adopters of the technology
in country i at time t and let y∗it represent the total potential number of adopters.
The fraction of adopters to potential adopters is given as follows:
yit
y∗it
= 11 + exp(−ait − bitt) (3.1)
This function is an S-shaped curve, with an inflection point at yit = 12y
∗
it. The
shape of this curve makes it very appropriate for representing technology diffusion
which tends to follow an S-shaped path, as the rate of adoption increases slowly
initially, then much more rapidly, and then slows down again as it approaches the
steady state level. This is the model most commonly used in the ICT diffusion
literature.
The variable ait is a location variable which shifts the curve forwards or back-
wards. The variable bit relates positively to the growth rate in adoption of the
technology:
dyit
dt
1
yit
= bit
y∗it − yit
y∗it
At the inflection point, the growth rate is equal to 12bit. The variables ait and bit
together give us information on the timing of adoption, e.g. the year at which
penetration reaches 10% of the potential level can be calculated as:
t0.1 =
(−2.2− ait)
bit
As most countries have not yet reached the steady state level of adoption of
mobile phones or the Internet, it will not be possible to say very much about
81
what factors affect this steady state. This paper will focus on understanding
which factors are related to the location variable, ait, and the growth variable,
bit, both of which affect the transition to the steady state. In the empirical
analysis, results will be presented for a number of different possible values of y∗it
in order to see how robust the results are to changes in this value. The following
section will discuss some of the factors which could explain differences in a and b
between countries.
3.2.2 Explanatory Variables
There is a large amount of variation in the rates of technology adoption in different
parts of the world. Figure 1 presents data on the average rates of mobile phone
use from 1990 to 2009 in different geographic regions of the world. Figure 2
presents the analogous data for Internet use. As can be seen from these graphs,
some parts of the world have adopted these technologies at significantly higher
rates than others. Figures 3 and 4 present the same data grouped into high
income countries and the rest of the world. These graphs demonstrate that poorer
countries still lag significantly behind richer countries in the use of ICTs. This
gap is particularly stark for Internet use.
Even within regions there is still significant variation in rates of ICT use.
Figures 5 and 6 present data on mobile phone and Internet use respectively for
six different countries in sub-Saharan Africa. As can be seen from this graph,
the gap between some of the most and least successful adopters is quite high.
Figures 7 and 8 present similar data for a selection of countries in the Middle
East and, once again, we can see that even within the same region there can be
large differences in the rates of ICT adoption between countries.
The aim of this paper is to try and understand what the main differences are
between countries who have successfully adopted ICTs and those who have not.
In what follows, the discussion will be focused on three categories of variables
which could play an important role in understanding these differences. These
categories are as follows: geographic, institutional and economic.
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3.2.2.1 Geographic Variables
The geographic variables which will be included in this study are an index of
ruggedness, population density and the proportion of the population living in ru-
ral areas. Each of these variables could be related both to the cost of constructing
ICT infrastructure and also to the benefit gained from using this technology.
The shape of the terrain can have an important influence on the cost of building
the infrastructure necessary for ICT use. We would expect that countries where
the terrain is more rugged would face higher costs of construction and this could
lead to lower rates of adoption.
Since there is a high fixed cost component to putting this infrastructure in
place in a particular area, the per capita cost should be lower in areas where
population density is higher. This would lead us to expect to see a positive
relationship between adoption rates and population density.
For a similar reason, the proportion of people living in rural areas could have
an influence on the cost of providing access to ICT infrastructure to the majority
of the population which would lead to a negative relationship between these two
variables.
On the other hand, all of these variables also affect the cost of communicat-
ing with other people in the absence of ICTs which means that the benefit of
using these technologies may be higher in cases where the cost of building the
infrastructure is higher. This will work in the opposite direction to the cost effect
described above.
3.2.2.2 Institutional Variables
Adopting ICTs involves a large fixed cost of investing in the infrastructure. This
means that the institutional environment could have an important influence on
whether or not private firms would be willing to undertake this investment and
will also affect the government’s decision or ability to carry out the investment
itself.
An environment that is conducive to private investment but also ensures that
services provided by private firms are affordable and reach most of the population
is necessary in order to increase rates of technology use. A number of factors can
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contribute to this. Usually, it would be wasteful to duplicate the underlying ICT
infrastructure which means that the regulatory environment could be very impor-
tant. This could be affected by the legal environment, the degree of competition
between ICT providers and the quality of government regulation. In addition,
the type of government regime could also have an influence both on the stability
of government and on the incentives that the government faces to encourage the
construction of ICT infrastructure.
3.2.2.3 Economic Variables
Using technology is costly both in terms of acquiring the initial infrastructure
and using the product. Therefore, it would be natural to expect that richer
countries will achieve higher rates of technology use sooner than poorer countries.
New information and communications technologies can be particularly useful for
individuals in developing countries, however, as they are substitutes for older
technologies such as fixed line telephones which are not as widely available in
poorer countries. Therefore, it is not clear that we will definitely see a positive
relationship between GDP p.c. and rates of ICT adoption once we have controlled
for other factors that influence the construction of the infrastructure.
The education level of the population will also affect their ability to use ICT. It
is necessary to be literate in order to use the Internet and so we would definitely
expect to see a positive relationship between rates of Internet adoption and lit-
eracy. This is less true for mobile phones although it is necessary for using SMSs
which have become an important form of communication. However, as literacy is
also a proxy for general level of education, we still may expect to see a positive
relationship between mobile phone use and literacy.
The importance of communication varies across sectors of the economy. It
is particularly important in the services sector. It is plausible that countries
where the services sector forms a larger part of the economy will have a greater
incentive to invest in adopting ICTs and will begin to adopt these technologies
earlier. Therefore we would expect to see a positive relationship between the
percentage of GDP coming from the services sector and rates of ICT adoption.
There has been a lot of discussion recently about the importance of ICTs for
agriculture so we might also expect to see a positive relationship between rates
of ICT use and the percentage of GDP coming from agriculture.
Finally, the decision to adopt a new technology may depend on what other
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alternatives are available. Fixed line telephones are a partial substitute for other
forms of communications technology suggesting a negative relationship between
the number of fixed line telephones and the rate of technology adoption. On the
other hand, fixed line telephones can be necessary to use the Internet and may
also be positively correlated with overall investment in telecommunications which
could lead to a positive relationship.
3.3 Empirical methodology
3.3.1 Empirical specification
Equation (3.1) can be transformed as follows:
log
(
yit
y∗it − yit
)
≡ zit = ait + bitt
It is assumed that y∗it is proportional to the total population of country i at time
t, i.e., y∗it = γiPopulationit, where γi is the fraction of the population which will
eventually adopt the technology. In practice it is very difficult to estimate γi,
as most countries have not yet reached a sufficiently high level of adoption. In
what follows, it will be assumed that γi is known and results will be presented for
different values of γi to see how sensitive they are to this value. The data on mobile
phone penetration rates are based on the number of mobile phone subscriptions
rather than mobile phone users which means that it is possible to have a value
of this variable greater than 100. In fact, for many countries which are highly
advanced in their use of this technology, the value of this variable is close to
200. However, the data for Internet penetration rates are based on the number
of Internet users and so the maximum possible value for this variable is 100. In
addition to using these values, some specifications will use predicted values of γi
for each country. These values are based on estimates of the relationship between
γi and different combinations of the other explanatory variables in a subset of
countries who are at advanced stages in the technology adoption process.
The equation to be estimated is:
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zit = αoit + xGitαG + xIitαI + xEitαE
+(βoit + xGitβG + xIitβI + xEitβE)t+ εit (3.2)
where xGit is a vector of geographic variables, xIit is a vector of institutional vari-
ables and xEit is a vector of economic variables.
3.3.2 Data
The dataset covers 164 countries for the period 1990-2008. Data on GDP p.c.,
population density, rural population, services value added, agriculture value added,
fixed telephone lines per 100 people and literacy are taken from the World Bank
World Development Indicators. Data on literacy are not available on an annual
basis. In order to deal with this, dummy variables were created and countries
were assigned to the following categories based on the available data: low (0-
20%), medium low (20-40%), medium (40-60%), medium high (60-80%) and high
(80-100%). Data on literacy rates were not available for many of the OECD
countries. However, as literacy is generally high in these countries, they have
been assigned to the high literacy category.
Data on ruggedness and legal origins come from the dataset used by Nunn and
Puga (2012). They have constructed a ruggedness index for each country which
gives a measure of the average terrain ruggedness of the country’s land area. The
units for the terrain ruggedness index correspond to units used to measure eleva-
tion differences. Data on the level of competition in the ICT sector come from the
International Telecommunications Union World Telecommunication Regulatory
Database. Using this data, dummy variables were constructed for whether the
type of competition in the ICT sector in a given year is a monopoly, partially
competitive or competitive. The regulatory quality indicator comes from the
Worldwide Governance Indicators database. The units in which it is measured
follow a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation of one8.
Data on the type of political regime come from the Polity IV database. As
recommended by the Polity IV project, countries are characterised as ‘autocracies’
if they have a polity score between -10 and -6, ‘anocracies’ if they have a score
of -5 to +5 or one of the special values of -66, -77 or -88, and ‘democracies’ if
8Kaufmann et al. 2008
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they have a score of +6 to +10. Dummies were constructed to represent each of
these categories. Regional dummies are also included in the regression but are
not reported in the results.
3.4 Empirical results
When interpreting the results it is important to distinguish between the location
parameters and the growth parameters. As mentioned in Section 2, the location
parameters shift the diffusion curve. A larger location parameter is associated
with an earlier date of initial adoption which means that rates of ICT use will be
higher at any point in time, all other things being equal. Therefore, a positive
location parameter for a particular variable means that higher values of that
variable are associated with higher rates of ICT use and a negative location
parameter means the opposite is true. The growth parameters determine the
rate at which the use of ICTs increase over time. If the growth parameter for a
particular variable has the opposite sign to that of the location parameter, this
means that the initial effect of that variable on rates of ICT use will diminish
over time. If, on the contrary, the sign of the growth parameter is the same as
that of the location parameter, this means that the effect will be reinforced over
time.
In what follows, results will be presented from regressions containing each
category of variable separately and the full regression including all explanatory
variables. As many of these variables are correlated with one another, the regres-
sions containing a reduced number of variables will suffer from omitted variables
bias. However, seeing how these estimates change when other variables are in-
cluded may help us to interpret the relationship that we observe between these
variables and the process of ICT adoption.
3.4.1 Mobile phone diffusion
The estimated location and growth parameters for mobile phone diffusion are
presented in Tables 1-4. Tables 1-3 present results for each category of explana-
tory variables separately. Table 4 presents the results from the full regression
containing all explanatory variables. In each table, the results in columns (1)
and (2) are based on a value of γ equal to 205, which is the maximum value
observed. The results in the other columns are based on a number of different
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predicted values of γi for each country. The results for each of the categories of
explanatory variables will now be discussed in turn.
3.4.1.1 Geographic Factors
Table 1 presents the results from a regression containing only the geographic vari-
ables. The location parameters are presented in the first part of the table and the
growth parameters are presented in the second part. The location parameter on
the ruggedness index is positive and significant in this regression. The location
parameter for rural population is negative and significant and the location param-
eter for population density is not significantly different from zero. However, these
results seem to be driven by omitted variable bias as the results change quite a
bit when all of the variables are included. The results from the full regression are
presented in Table 4, where the location and growth parameters are presented
side by side. In particular, the geographic variables seem to be highly correlated
with GDP p.c., fixed line telephones and literacy. As we can see from columns
(2), (4), (6) and (8), when these variables are included the results are a lot closer
to the results that we see in Table 4.
The location parameter on population density is negative in Table 4. If we
think about this variable from a cost perspective, this is a surprising result as we
would expect that a lower population density would add to the cost of construct-
ing ICT infrastructure. However, from a benefit point of view, a lower population
density also adds to the cost of communicating with others over distances which
is something that mobile phones can help to overcome. Therefore the lower the
population density, the greater the benefit of mobile phones. This could possibly
explain the result that we see here. The sign of the growth parameter for popu-
lation density is negative which means that the initial effect of this variable will
diminish over time. The location parameters for the proportion of the population
living in rural areas and for the ruggedness index are both positive in Table 4 but
are not significantly different from zero.
3.4.1.2 Institutional Factors
Table 2 presents the results from a regression containing only the institutional
variables. As was the case with the geographic variables these variables are
correlated with a number of other variables and so the values of the parameters
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change when all variables are included. As we can see from columns (2), (4), (6)
and (8), including GDP p.c. and fixed line telephones in particular reduces the
estimates of the location parameters for the democracy dummy and regulatory
quality.
Looking at the results from the full regression in Table 4, we can see that the
institutional variables seem to be strongly related to the rate of mobile phone
adoption. The location parameters for the democratic dummy and the auto-
cratic dummy are both positive and significantly different from zero. This could
suggest that what is important for the adoption of mobile phones is to have
a strong, stable government which is able to coordinate investment in mobile
phone infrastructure. This does not necessarily mean that the government must
be democratically elected. The growth parameters for these variables are both
negative which would suggest that this effect should diminish over time. How-
ever, only the parameter for the autocratic dummy is significantly different from
zero. The location parameter for regulatory quality is positive and significantly
different from zero suggesting that countries with better regulation adopt ICTs
earlier. The growth parameter for this variable is negative but is not significantly
different from zero in any of the specifications. This means that the initial effect
of earlier adoption by countries with better regulation could have a permanent
effect on the rate of technology use as there is no evidence that countries with
poorer regulation will catch up over time.
In order to investigate the relationship between the type of competition in the
mobile phone market and rates of mobile phone use dummy variables have been
included for the case of a monopoly and the case of partial competition. The
omitted category is a competitive mobile phone market. The results suggest that
countries where the mobile phone market is partially competitive adopt mobile
phone technology earlier than countries where this sector is fully competitive as
the location parameter for this variable is positive and significant. This could
be because of the fixed costs involved in providing and maintaining the mobile
phone infrastructure, meaning that companies will be more likely to invest if they
are likely to earn a higher profit. The growth parameter for this variable is neg-
ative and significantly different from zero, suggesting that this effect diminishes
over time. The location parameter for a monopoly is also positive but is only
significantly different from zero in two of the specifications.
The final institutional variable that will be discussed is legal origins. Previous
research suggests that differences in legal origin can have an effect on a number
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of different aspect of the economic environment including the burden of entry
regulation and regulation of labour markets9. A dummy variable is included
which is equal to one for countries whose legal origins come from common law.
In general civil law is associated with higher levels of government intervention
than common law. The location parameter for this variable is negative but it is
not significantly different from zero in any of the specifications.
3.4.1.3 Economic Factors
The results for the regression containing just the economic factors are presented in
Table 3. Unlike with the other variables, these results do not change dramatically
when other variables are included in the regression.
The location parameter for GDP p.c. in Table 4 is positive and significant
and the growth parameter is negative and significant which is consistent with
what we would expect. It suggests that richer countries are earlier adopters of
mobile phone technology but that the rate of technology use in poorer countries
will grow faster than that in richer countries, eliminating the initial effect over
time.
There certainly seems to be evidence that education is positively correlated
with mobile phone use. The omitted category for the literacy dummies is ‘high’
literacy, meaning over 80% of the population is literate. The coefficients on the
lowest three literacy dummy variables are all negative and significant suggesting
that countries with higher literacy rates are earlier adopters of mobile phone
technology. The growth parameters for these variables have positive signs, which
means that countries with lower literacy rates should catch up over time in terms
of mobile phone use. However, the growth parameter for low literacy is not
significantly different from zero so it is possible that the effect of very low literacy
could be quite persistent over time.
We expected to find a positive relationship between the proportion of GDP
from the services sector and rates of mobile phone use. The location parameter
for this variable is positive and significantly different from zero. The location
parameter for the proportion of GDP from the agricultural sector is negative
which means that countries where agriculture is relatively more important are
later adopters of mobile phone technology. This is somewhat surprising given
9La Porta et al. (2007)
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the attention that has been given recently to the importance of mobile phones
in agricultural markets. However, this parameter is only significantly different
from zero in two of the specifications. The growth parameter for this variable is
positive but is not significantly different from zero which means that this effect
could be persistent over time.
Finally, the results suggest that there is a positive relationship between the
number of fixed line telephones and early adoption of mobile phone technology.
This goes against the story that mobile phones are being used as a substitute
for fixed line telephones which would lead to a negative relationship. Given that
we do not have a good measure of mobile phone infrastructure or investment in
telecommunications, it is possible that this variable is picking this up as these
variables are likely to be positively correlated. The growth parameter is negative
but is only significantly different from zero in one of the specifications.
3.4.2 Internet diffusion
The results for Internet diffusion are presented in Tables 5-8 in a way analogous
to those for mobile phone diffusion. The results in columns (1) and (2) are based
on a value of γ equal to 100. The results in the other columns are based on the
predicted values of γi for each country. Tables 5-7 present the results for each
category of explanatory variable separately. The results from the full regression
containing all explanatory variables are presented in Table 8. The results for each
of the categories of explanatory variables will now be discussed in turn.
3.4.2.1 Geographic Factors
The results of the regressions containing only geographic variables are presented
in Table 5. As was the case with mobile phones, these variables are correlated with
a number of other variables, in particular GDP p.c. and fixed line telephones and
the values of the estimates change when these variables are included. The results
for the regression containing all explanatory variables are presented in Table 8. In
this table, the location parameters for all of the geographic variables are negative
but none are significantly different from zero suggesting that geographic variables
are not that important in explaining rates of Internet adoption.
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3.4.2.2 Institutional Factors
The results for the regression containing just institutional variables are presented
in Table 6. However, as was the case with the geographic variables, the estimates
change quite a lot when GDP p.c. and fixed line telephones are included so the
following discussion will focus on the estimates from the full regression which are
presented in Table 8.
As in the case of mobile phone diffusion, there is evidence that regulatory
quality is important for Internet adoption. The location parameter is positive and
strongly significant. The growth parameter is negative and significant suggesting
that the initial effect diminishes over time.
However, the other institutional variables do not seem to be as important for
Internet diffusion as they were for mobile phone diffusion. The location parameter
for the democracy dummy is positive but not significantly different from zero.
The equivalent parameter for the autocracy dummy is negative but is also not
significantly different from zero in any of the specifications.
There is not strong evidence that the type of competition in the Internet market
has an important effect on rates of Internet use as none of the location parameters
are significantly different from zero. The growth parameter for internet services
monopoly dummy is positive and significantly different from zero. The location
parameter for this variable is negative suggesting that a monopoly in this sector
could be associated with lower rates of Internet adoption. However, it is not
significantly different from zero.
As was the case for mobile phones, the location parameter for legal origins
that come from common law is negative but is not significantly different from
zero. However, the growth parameter for this variable is positive and significantly
different from zero suggesting that this variable may have an effect on Internet
adoption.
3.4.2.3 Economic Factors
The economic variables seem to be the most important for understanding rates
of Internet use. The results for the regression containing only economic variables
are presented in Table 7. As can be seen from Table 8, these results do not
change dramatically when other variables are included in the regression. The
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location parameter for GDP p.c. is negative but is not significantly different
from zero in the specifications presented in Table 8. This is somewhat surprising
as we would expect this parameter to be positive. However, the results for GDP
p.c. change significantly when the number of fixed line telephones is included.
Table 9 presents results for regressions containing just GDP p.c. or GDP p.c and
fixed line telephones.10 As we can see from the results in this table, the location
parameter for GDP p.c is positive if the number of fixed telephone lines is not
included in the regression but becomes negative if this variable is included. The
location parameter for fixed line telephones in Table 8 is positive and significantly
different from zero. As the number of fixed telephone lines is positively related to
GDP p.c. and also to the level of Internet use this suggests that the main way in
which GDP p.c. is positively related to Internet use could be through investment
in telecommunications infrastructure. If the inclusion of fixed telephone lines
captures some of the effect of investment in telecommunications then it is less
surprising that the location parameter for GDP p.c. becomes smaller and could
be negative, as it is possible that poorer countries have more to gain from Internet
use. The growth parameter for fixed telephone lines is negative which means that
these effects become smaller over time.
The location parameters for the lower literacy dummies are negative and sig-
nificant. This is consistent with what we would expect since it is necessary to be
literate in order to use the Internet. The growth parameters for these variables
are positive and significant suggesting that this effect diminishes over time.
As was the case with mobile phones, the location parameters for the proportion
of GDP coming from the services sector and agriculture are positive and negative,
respectively. The magnitude of the location parameter for agriculture is similar
in magnitude to that for mobile phones and is significantly different from zero.
However, the growth parameter is not significantly different from zero which
could mean that this effect is persistent over time. The location parameter for
the services variable is smaller than that for mobile phones and is not significantly
different from zero.
3.4.3 Discussion
The results presented above suggest that the institutional environment can have
a significant influence on the process of technology diffusion. This is perhaps not
10Regional dummies are also included in these regressions but the results are not reported.
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surprising given the large investment costs required to provide the infrastructure
necessary to use these technologies. Some degree of coordination at a national,
or at least regional, level is required in order to make sure this infrastructure is in
place. In particular, the quality of government regulation seems to be positively
related to rates of mobile phone and Internet adoption. It is also necessary to
have a population which is sufficiently well-educated that they are able to use
the technology. Other institutional and geographic variables seem to be more
strongly related to the process of diffusion of mobile phones than for the Internet.
In particular, having a strong and stable government seems to be more important
for mobile phone adoption. As the process of Internet adoption is still not that
advanced in most countries, it could be that it is not yet possible to precisely
estimate the relationship between these variables and rates of Internet adoption
later in the diffusion process.
3.5 Conclusion
Although there has been a rapid increase in the use of ICTs in the past few
years, a large portion of the world’s population still do not have access to these
technologies and we have reason to be concerned that some countries are being left
behind. Given the huge potential that these technologies have for development, it
is important for us to try and understand the main barriers to adoption of these
technologies.
This paper used a logistic model of technology diffusion to investigate the
relationship between rates of mobile phone and Internet use and a number of
geographic, institutional and economic variables. The results suggest that coun-
tries with better regulatory quality, high literacy rates and a smaller agricultural
sector have higher rates of mobile phone and Internet use. In addition, it seems
that countries which have lower levels of fixed line telephones also have lower
rates of use of other ICTs. The relationship between a number of institutional
variables and income per capita and the process of ICT diffusion differs between
mobile phones and the Internet and it is possible that these differences could be
explained by the differences between these technologies both in terms of the cost
involved in providing the infrastructure and the different ways in which these
technologies are used.
Of course, all of these variables may be correlated with a number of other
factors which may influence rates of ICT use and it is very difficult to know the
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specific ways in which they affect the process of technology diffusion. However, the
results from this paper do give us an idea of the main characteristics of countries
which have been successful in adopting ICTs. Though perhaps unsurprising, the
picture to emerge from this analysis is somewhat discouraging from a development
perspective as it seems that the countries which have been most successful at
adopting ICTs have also been more successful in a number of other ways. The
unfortunate consequence of this could be that individuals who might benefit the
most from ICTs are the ones who are least likely to have access to them.
Given that large scale investments in infrastructure are required to ensure
access to these technologies, which often require coordination or oversight by
governments, a deeper analysis of the policies implemented by governments in
countries which have achieved high rates of ICT use could give us greater insight
into how this process works. It would be particularly useful to understand why
a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa have achieved great success in this regard
while most are lagging far behind. Given the great potential that ICTs hold for
development it is important for us to try and understand where these differences
come from.
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Figure 3.1: Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 by geographic region
Figure 3.2: Internet users per 100 by geographic region
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Figure 3.3: Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 by income level
Figure 3.4: Internet users per 100 by income level
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Figure 3.5: Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 for a selection of countries in
Africa
Figure 3.6: Internet users per 100 for a selection of countries in Africa
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Figure 3.7: Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 for a selection of countries in the
Middle East
Figure 3.8: Internet users per 100 for a selection of countries in the Middle East
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Table 1: Geographic variables and rates of mobile phone use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION
Rugged 0.770*** 0.0262 0.860*** 0.121 0.853*** 0.128 0.728*** 0.00480
(0.245) (0.184) (0.255) (0.191) (0.251) (0.190) (0.252) (0.192)
Pop Density -6.04e-05 -0.000473** -2.28e-05 -0.000284 5.24e-05 -0.000266 -0.000214 -0.000539***
(0.000472) (0.000201) (0.000474) (0.000197) (0.000466) (0.000199) (0.000437) (0.000194)
Rural Pop -0.144*** -6.53e-05 -0.122*** 0.0130 -0.118*** 0.0181 -0.121*** 0.0152
(0.0173) (0.0139) (0.0185) (0.0150) (0.0181) (0.0151) (0.0181) (0.0152)
GDPpc 3.86e-05 2.25e-05 4.96e-05 3.76e-05
(3.99e-05) (4.20e-05) (4.16e-05) (4.13e-05)
Fixed 0.228*** 0.210*** 0.208*** 0.215***
Telephones (0.0266) (0.0279) (0.0282) (0.0286)
Low -7.025*** -6.640*** -6.335*** -6.492***
Literacy (1.353) (1.385) (1.395) (1.387)
Medium Low -3.505*** -3.187*** -2.880*** -2.982***
Literacy (0.898) (0.925) (0.942) (0.938)
Medium -2.979*** -2.745*** -2.414*** -2.440***
Literacy (0.743) (0.764) (0.773) (0.775)
Medium High -0.498 -0.312 -0.0521 -0.0162
Literacy (0.597) (0.619) (0.629) (0.631)
GROWTH
Rugged -0.0292*** -0.00368 -0.0332*** -0.00849 -0.0329*** -0.00854 -0.0240** 0.000258
(0.00927) (0.00706) (0.00981) (0.00745) (0.00964) (0.00745) (0.00971) (0.00755)
Pop Density 7.47e-06 1.82e-05** 4.52e-06 7.09e-06 8.42e-07 6.49e-06 1.64e-05 2.24e-05***
(1.95e-05) (8.19e-06) (1.98e-05) (8.12e-06) (1.94e-05) (8.27e-06) (1.82e-05) (8.11e-06)
Rural Pop 0.00413*** -0.000600 0.00281*** -0.00135** 0.00265*** -0.00163*** 0.00278*** -0.00149**
(0.000677) (0.000555) (0.000742) (0.000619) (0.000727) (0.000627) (0.000727) (0.000627)
GDPpc -1.36e-06 -1.80e-07 -1.45e-06 -8.96e-07
(1.52e-06) (1.65e-06) (1.63e-06) (1.62e-06)
Fixed -0.00729*** -0.00634*** -0.00639*** -0.00671***
Telephones (0.00103) (0.00112) (0.00114) (0.00116)
Low 0.226*** 0.209*** 0.195*** 0.203***
Literacy (0.0619) (0.0635) (0.0640) (0.0636)
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GROWTH
Medium Low 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.0876** 0.0933**
Literacy (0.0356) (0.0370) (0.0379) (0.0377)
Medium 0.0827*** 0.0727** 0.0568* 0.0585*
Literacy (0.0292) (0.0303) (0.0308) (0.0309)
Medium High 0.00370 -0.00355 -0.0159 -0.0175
Literacy (0.0233) (0.0246) (0.0252) (0.0253)
t 0.282*** 0.523*** 0.389*** 0.601*** 0.407*** 0.638*** 0.387*** 0.616***
(0.0459) (0.0403) (0.0497) (0.0437) (0.0493) (0.0454) (0.0492) (0.0453)
Constant -8.165*** -15.33*** -9.522*** -16.30*** -9.902*** -16.97*** -9.537*** -16.59***
(1.191) (1.036) (1.259) (1.090) (1.247) (1.126) (1.246) (1.124)
Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266
R-squared 0.756 0.851 0.770 0.860 0.776 0.859 0.775 0.857
that have achieved a high level of mobile phone penetration.
(iv) Regional dummies included in all regressions.
Notes:
Table 1 (cont.): Geographic variables and rates of mobile phone use
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
(v) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(vi) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(i) Regression of ln(yit/(yit
*
-yit)) on geographic variables.
(ii) yit
*
=γiPopulationi 
(iii) In the first specification, γ is constant and set equal to 205. In the following three specifications γ it is a predicted value based on the 
results of regressions of the number of mobile phone subscriptions in 2009 on various explanatory variables for a subsample of countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION
Democratic 2.565*** 1.798*** 2.606*** 1.876*** 2.643*** 1.969*** 2.481*** 1.769***
(0.618) (0.564) (0.643) (0.591) (0.648) (0.606) (0.641) (0.598)
Autocratic 1.832** 1.189* 1.850** 1.336* 1.824** 1.298* 1.872** 1.294*
(0.766) (0.688) (0.784) (0.701) (0.807) (0.722) (0.795) (0.716)
Regulatory 3.534*** 1.444*** 2.996*** 1.127*** 3.150*** 1.297*** 3.154*** 1.230***
Quality (0.332) (0.362) (0.342) (0.378) (0.349) (0.395) (0.345) (0.379)
Mobile -0.546 -0.221 -0.0858 0.259 0.213 0.541 0.117 0.457
Monopoly (0.640) (0.561) (0.659) (0.580) (0.668) (0.594) (0.667) (0.591)
Mobile 0.622 0.936** 0.376 0.638 0.597 0.892* 0.643 0.944**
Partial Comp (0.494) (0.457) (0.513) (0.469) (0.515) (0.476) (0.513) (0.474)
Common Law 0.579 0.574 0.555 0.505 0.419 0.369 0.485 0.452
(0.557) (0.509) (0.581) (0.531) (0.598) (0.552) (0.600) (0.554)
GDPpc 0.000106*** 9.52e-05** 0.000119*** 0.000113***
(3.80e-05) (4.01e-05) (4.25e-05) (4.24e-05)
Fixed 0.121*** 0.105*** 0.0905*** 0.101***
Telephones (0.0238) (0.0261) (0.0297) (0.0280)
GROWTH
Democratic -0.0883*** -0.0617*** -0.0904*** -0.0657*** -0.0928*** -0.0703*** -0.0857*** -0.0615**
(0.0240) (0.0221) (0.0254) (0.0236) (0.0258) (0.0244) (0.0255) (0.0240)
Autocratic -0.0694** -0.0477* -0.0684** -0.0543* -0.0678** -0.0528* -0.0706** -0.0534*
(0.0303) (0.0272) (0.0314) (0.0281) (0.0327) (0.0293) (0.0320) (0.0289)
Regulatory -0.0987*** -0.0255* -0.0661*** -0.00651 -0.0751*** -0.0148 -0.0752*** -0.0120
Quality (0.0131) (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.0162) (0.0139) (0.0154)
Mobile 0.00422 -0.00897 -0.0174 -0.0313 -0.0322 -0.0453* -0.0268 -0.0405
Monopoly (0.0268) (0.0239) (0.0280) (0.0250) (0.0286) (0.0258) (0.0285) (0.0257)
Mobile -0.0233 -0.0349** -0.0128 -0.0208 -0.0234 -0.0331* -0.0257 -0.0355*
Partial Comp (0.0190) (0.0177) (0.0201) (0.0185) (0.0203) (0.0189) (0.0202) (0.0188)
Common Law -0.0189 -0.0183 -0.0185 -0.0158 -0.0117 -0.00894 -0.0149 -0.0128
(0.0219) (0.0202) (0.0233) (0.0215) (0.0242) (0.0226) (0.0243) (0.0227)
Table 2: Institutional variables and rates of mobile phone use
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GROWTH
GDPpc -4.54e-06*** -3.64e-06** -4.74e-06*** -4.41e-06***
(1.45e-06) (1.58e-06) (1.70e-06) (1.70e-06)
Fixed -0.00377*** -0.00292*** -0.00239** -0.00288**
Telephones (0.000915) (0.00105) (0.00122) (0.00114)
t 0.539*** 0.582*** 0.586*** 0.615*** 0.591*** 0.622*** 0.590*** 0.623***
(0.0262) (0.0258) (0.0285) (0.0280) (0.0299) (0.0296) (0.0292) (0.0286)
Constant -16.66*** -17.90*** -17.04*** -18.04*** -17.10*** -18.12*** -17.08*** -18.15***
(0.659) (0.643) (0.703) (0.685) (0.729) (0.715) (0.716) (0.696)
Observations 1,266 1266 1,266 1266 1,266 1266 1,266 1266
R-squared 0.855 0.876 0.866 0.885 0.861 0.879 0.862 0.880
(v) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(vi) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(i) Regression of ln(yit/(yit
*
-yit)) on institutional variables.
(ii) yit
*
=γiPopulationi 
(iii) In the first specification, γ is constant and set equal to 205. In the following three specifications γ it is a predicted value based on the 
results of regressions of the number of mobile phone subscriptions in 2009 on various explanatory variables for a subsample of countries 
that have achieved a high level of mobile phone penetration.
(iv) Regional dummies included in all regressions.
Table 2 (cont.): Institutional variables and rates of mobile phone use
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
Notes:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH
GDPpc 8.63e-05** -3.32e-06** 7.02e-05* -2.14e-06 9.70e-05** -3.37e-06** 8.67e-05** -2.81e-06*
(3.92e-05) (1.48e-06) (4.19e-05) (1.65e-06) (4.28e-05) (1.69e-06) (4.27e-05) (1.69e-06)
Low -3.891* 0.128 -4.070* 0.138 -3.739* 0.121 -3.726* 0.116
Literacy (2.128) (0.0966) (2.121) (0.0963) (2.135) (0.0970) (2.117) (0.0962)
Medium Low -3.407*** 0.145*** -3.712*** 0.163*** -3.461*** 0.150*** -3.346*** 0.142***
Literacy (0.961) (0.0387) (0.993) (0.0407) (1.017) (0.0420) (1.000) (0.0412)
Medium -1.692** 0.0663** -1.894** 0.0785** -1.611** 0.0642* -1.601** 0.0615*
Literacy (0.773) (0.0310) (0.799) (0.0326) (0.810) (0.0333) (0.802) (0.0329)
Medium High -0.292 0.0121 -0.226 0.0112 0.0597 -0.00270 0.161 -0.00892
Literacy (0.565) (0.0226) (0.593) (0.0243) (0.610) (0.0252) (0.604) (0.0249)
Services 0.0658*** -0.00230** 0.0629** -0.00212** 0.0734*** -0.00258** 0.0682*** -0.00231**
(0.0247) (0.000946) (0.0256) (0.000998) (0.0258) (0.00102) (0.0256) (0.00101)
Agriculture -0.0637** 0.000484 -0.0360 -0.000940 -0.0298 -0.00120 -0.0333 -0.000965
(0.0251) (0.000992) (0.0260) (0.00105) (0.0261) (0.00106) (0.0258) (0.00105)
Fixed 0.129*** -0.00385*** 0.116*** -0.00306** 0.108*** -0.00284** 0.117*** -0.00331***
Telephones (0.0279) (0.00108) (0.0295) (0.00119) (0.0306) (0.00125) (0.0306) (0.00124)
t_mobile 0.552*** 0.590*** 0.637*** 0.622***
(0.0520) (0.0548) (0.0565) (0.0552)
Constant -16.63*** -16.96*** -17.91*** -17.64***
(1.380) (1.425) (1.450) (1.425)
Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266
R-squared 0.874 0.878 0.875 0.875
(v) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(vi) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(i) Regression of ln(yit/(yit
*
-yit)) on economic variables.
(ii) yit
*
=γiPopulationi 
(iii) In the first specification, γ is constant and set equal to 205. In the following three specifications γ it is a predicted value based on the 
results of regressions of the number of mobile phone subscriptions in 2009 on various explanatory variables for a subsample of countries 
that have achieved a high level of mobile phone penetration.
(iv) Regional dummies included in all regressions.
Table 3: Economic variables and rates of mobile phone use
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
Notes:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH
Rugged 0.107 -0.00533 0.197 -0.00975 0.188 -0.00901 0.0617 2.69e-05
(0.161) (0.00620) (0.164) (0.00639) (0.165) (0.00648) (0.168) (0.00668)
Pop Density -0.000630** 2.53e-05** -0.000495** 1.61e-05 -0.000493** 1.61e-05 -0.000787*** 3.30e-05***
(0.000246) (9.96e-06) (0.000242) (9.93e-06) (0.000245) (1.01e-05) (0.000230) (9.48e-06)
Rural Pop 0.000828 -0.000346 0.00754 -0.000800 0.0144 -0.00116** 0.00995 -0.000946*
(0.0133) (0.000524) (0.0137) (0.000554) (0.0140) (0.000573) (0.0139) (0.000567)
Democratic 0.903* -0.0259 0.897* -0.0264 1.030* -0.0330 0.942* -0.0289
(0.516) (0.0202) (0.529) (0.0211) (0.538) (0.0216) (0.537) (0.0215)
Autocratic 1.173** -0.0510** 1.286** -0.0565** 1.269** -0.0560** 1.423** -0.0636**
(0.595) (0.0237) (0.605) (0.0245) (0.621) (0.0254) (0.613) (0.0250)
Regulatory 1.271*** -0.0231 1.065*** -0.00907 1.248*** -0.0181 1.205*** -0.0166
Quality (0.389) (0.0154) (0.393) (0.0159) (0.413) (0.0170) (0.403) (0.0165)
Mobile 0.224 -0.0250 0.604 -0.0416* 0.910* -0.0568** 1.069** -0.0652***
Monopoly (0.514) (0.0220) (0.533) (0.0233) (0.547) (0.0241) (0.542) (0.0238)
Mobile 1.230*** -0.0463*** 0.986** -0.0347** 1.255*** -0.0478*** 1.218*** -0.0461***
Partial Comp (0.412) (0.0160) (0.417) (0.0166) (0.422) (0.0168) (0.421) (0.0168)
Common Law -0.0260 0.00481 -0.158 0.0109 -0.330 0.0193 -0.282 0.0169
(0.452) (0.0177) (0.460) (0.0183) (0.475) (0.0191) (0.479) (0.0193)
GDPpc 0.000153*** -6.53e-06*** 0.000150*** -6.06e-06*** 0.000176*** -7.29e-06*** 0.000164*** -6.69e-06***
(3.43e-05) (1.32e-06) (3.53e-05) (1.39e-06) (3.85e-05) (1.55e-06) (3.86e-05) (1.56e-06)
Low -4.000** 0.114 -4.162** 0.122 -4.115** 0.119 -4.231** 0.126
Literacy (1.783) (0.0825) (1.781) (0.0827) (1.773) (0.0821) (1.769) (0.0819)
Medium Low -2.385** 0.0895** -2.233** 0.0843** -1.947** 0.0703* -2.041** 0.0752*
Literacy (0.933) (0.0376) (0.944) (0.0383) (0.959) (0.0390) (0.953) (0.0387)
Medium -2.033*** 0.0719** -1.997*** 0.0723** -1.679** 0.0564* -1.708** 0.0584**
Literacy (0.725) (0.0285) (0.728) (0.0287) (0.732) (0.0290) (0.734) (0.0292)
Medium High -0.0366 -0.00396 0.111 -0.00876 0.385 -0.0218 0.445 -0.0246
Literacy (0.499) (0.0201) (0.517) (0.0211) (0.536) (0.0222) (0.533) (0.0220)
Services 0.0409* -0.00200** 0.0421* -0.00208** 0.0469* -0.00227** 0.0477** -0.00232**
(0.0237) (0.000915) (0.0238) (0.000931) (0.0242) (0.000955) (0.0242) (0.000952)
Table 4: All variables and rates of mobile phone use
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH
Agriculture -0.0600** 0.00102 -0.0440* 0.000275 -0.0406 0.000135 -0.0404 0.000106
(0.0257) (0.00103) (0.0257) (0.00104) (0.0258) (0.00105) (0.0257) (0.00105)
Fixed 0.0635*** -0.00195** 0.0506** -0.00132 0.0410 -0.00103 0.0510* -0.00147
Telephones (0.0231) (0.000898) (0.0254) (0.00103) (0.0286) (0.00118) (0.0281) (0.00116)
t_mobile 0.580*** 0.665*** 0.716*** 0.694***
(0.0545) (0.0557) (0.0590) (0.0582)
Constant -15.90*** -16.96*** -17.97*** -17.57***
(1.424) (1.433) (1.493) (1.477)
Observations 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266
R-squared 0.913 0.920 0.917 0.916
(vi) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 (cont.): Rates of mobile phone use and all explanatory variables
(v) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(i) Regression of ln(yit/(yit
*
-yit)) on all explanatory variables.
(ii) yit
*
=γiPopulationi 
(iii) In the first specification, γ is constant and set equal to 205. In the following three specifications γ it is a predicted value based on the 
results of regressions of the number of mobile phone subscriptions in 2009 on various explanatory variables for a subsample of countries 
that have achieved a high level of mobile phone penetration.
(iv) Regional dummies included in all regressions.
Notes:
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION
Rugged 0.0578 -0.0778 0.0889 -0.0375 0.0781 -0.0468 0.0543 -0.0691
(0.164) (0.123) (0.167) (0.125) (0.169) (0.124) (0.189) (0.131)
Pop Density 5.29e-05 -0.000133 -6.72e-05 -0.000197 -7.63e-05 -0.000190 -0.000120 -0.000219
(0.000262) (0.000137) (0.000251) (0.000133) (0.000249) (0.000133) (0.000263) (0.000145)
Rural Pop -0.113*** -0.0380*** -0.109*** -0.0361*** -0.109*** -0.0365*** -0.119*** -0.0432***
(0.0160) (0.0113) (0.0163) (0.0114) (0.0164) (0.0114) (0.0179) (0.0127)
GDPpc -7.17e-05** -8.79e-05*** -9.07e-05*** -0.000115***
(2.90e-05) (3.04e-05) (3.06e-05) (3.02e-05)
Fixed 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.182***
Telephones (0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0210)
GROWTH
Rugged -0.00243 0.00306 -0.00536 -0.00103 -0.00405 -5.77e-05 0.00261 0.00624
(0.0102) (0.00783) (0.0105) (0.00808) (0.0107) (0.00802) (0.0122) (0.00844)
Pop Density 5.74e-06 5.85e-06 1.99e-05 1.40e-05 2.09e-05 1.31e-05 2.97e-05* 1.97e-05**
(1.66e-05) (8.92e-06) (1.61e-05) (8.88e-06) (1.59e-05) (8.87e-06) (1.68e-05) (9.84e-06)
Rural Pop 0.00450*** 0.00128* 0.00417*** 0.00126* 0.00417*** 0.00134* 0.00439*** 0.00150*
(0.000997) (0.000709) (0.00103) (0.000720) (0.00103) (0.000717) (0.00113) (0.000793)
GDPpc 5.10e-06*** 6.82e-06*** 7.53e-06*** 9.00e-06***
(1.83e-06) (1.96e-06) (1.97e-06) (1.95e-06)
Fixed -0.00675*** -0.00642*** -0.00662*** -0.00706***
Telephones (0.00124) (0.00130) (0.00129) (0.00133)
t 0.142** 0.374*** 0.166** 0.378*** 0.163** 0.372*** 0.149** 0.362***
(0.0678) (0.0499) (0.0699) (0.0507) (0.0701) (0.0505) (0.0756) (0.0547)
Constant -3.921*** -9.251*** -3.832*** -9.044*** -3.845*** -9.054*** -3.804*** -9.250***
(1.102) (0.814) (1.122) (0.820) (1.126) (0.818) (1.219) (0.899)
Observations 1,142 1142 1,142 1142 1,142 1142 1,142 1142
R-squared 0.762 0.859 0.755 0.858 0.753 0.861 0.752 0.861
(v) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(vi) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Geographic variables and rates of Internet use
(i) Regression of ln(yit/(yit
*
-yit)) on geographic variables.
(ii) yit
*
=γiPopulationi 
(iii) In the first specification, γ is constant and set equal to 205. In the following three specifications γ it is a predicted value based on the 
results of regressions of the number of Internet users in 2009 on various explanatory variables for a subsample of countries that have 
achieved a high level of Internet penetration.
(iv) Regional dummies included in all regressions.
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
Notes:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION
Democratic 1.852** 0.460 1.915** 0.506 1.939*** 0.501 2.048** 0.461
(0.738) (0.638) (0.747) (0.642) (0.747) (0.641) (0.807) (0.683)
Autocratic -0.548 -0.589 -0.596 -0.543 -0.583 -0.552 -0.767 -0.638
(1.179) (1.031) (1.182) (1.029) (1.182) (1.026) (1.233) (1.062)
Regulatory 2.497*** 1.168*** 2.312*** 1.085*** 2.322*** 1.124*** 2.441*** 1.226***
Quality (0.247) (0.241) (0.252) (0.244) (0.253) (0.242) (0.274) (0.263)
DSL -0.438 -0.186 -0.367 -0.108 -0.384 -0.118 -0.292 -0.0391
Monopoly (0.605) (0.539) (0.602) (0.536) (0.602) (0.534) (0.634) (0.554)
DSL -1.765*** -1.328** -1.677*** -1.214** -1.706*** -1.226** -1.700*** -1.204**
Partial Comp (0.560) (0.548) (0.565) (0.550) (0.564) (0.549) (0.575) (0.550)
Int. Services -0.879 -0.777 -0.913 -0.793 -0.916 -0.793 -0.901 -0.736
Monopoly (0.711) (0.633) (0.706) (0.629) (0.706) (0.627) (0.739) (0.655)
Int. Services 1.530*** 1.234** 1.454*** 1.176** 1.468*** 1.199** 1.503** 1.227**
Partial Comp (0.549) (0.531) (0.548) (0.530) (0.547) (0.529) (0.594) (0.567)
Common Law -0.0441 -0.000871 -0.0943 -0.0444 -0.0937 -0.0271 0.0535 0.128
(0.458) (0.384) (0.460) (0.385) (0.461) (0.385) (0.496) (0.414)
GDPpc 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.149***
(0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0201)
Fixed -0.0121 -0.0154 -0.0148 -0.0142
Telephones (0.0254) (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0273)
GROWTH
Democratic -0.0595** -6.21e-05** -0.0636** -7.27e-05** -0.0647** -7.70e-05*** -0.0692** -0.000107***
(0.0293) (2.73e-05) (0.0300) (2.88e-05) (0.0300) (2.94e-05) (0.0324) (2.97e-05)
Autocratic 0.0302 0.0212 0.0322 0.0183 0.0320 0.0186 0.0427 0.0242
(0.0475) (0.0414) (0.0479) (0.0415) (0.0479) (0.0414) (0.0499) (0.0427)
Regulatory -0.0936*** -0.0455*** -0.0721*** -0.0359** -0.0719*** -0.0402** -0.0693*** -0.0416**
Quality (0.0162) (0.0156) (0.0169) (0.0161) (0.0171) (0.0160) (0.0186) (0.0172)
DSL 0.0209 0.0111 0.0115 0.00197 0.0124 0.00307 0.00647 -0.00153
Monopoly (0.0396) (0.0351) (0.0397) (0.0351) (0.0397) (0.0350) (0.0419) (0.0364)
Table 6: Institutional variables and rates of Internet use
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GROWTH
DSL 0.0668* 0.0448 0.0568 0.0335 0.0591 0.0349 0.0605 0.0357
Partial Comp (0.0359) (0.0350) (0.0370) (0.0356) (0.0369) (0.0355) (0.0372) (0.0352)
Int. Services 0.0720 0.0535 0.0782 0.0572 0.0788 0.0570 0.0700 0.0440
Monopoly (0.0499) (0.0443) (0.0497) (0.0439) (0.0498) (0.0438) (0.0522) (0.0462)
Int. Services -0.0767** -0.0660* -0.0669* -0.0581* -0.0677* -0.0599* -0.0759* -0.0687*
Partial Comp (0.0367) (0.0351) (0.0370) (0.0352) (0.0369) (0.0351) (0.0398) (0.0375)
Common Law 0.0417 0.0382 0.0457 0.0411 0.0454 0.0391 0.0359 0.0288
(0.0293) (0.0248) (0.0299) (0.0253) (0.0299) (0.0252) (0.0323) (0.0272)
GDPpc 3.51e-06** 4.72e-06** 5.58e-06*** 7.49e-06***
(1.73e-06) (1.87e-06) (1.92e-06) (1.95e-06)
Fixed -0.00500*** -0.00460*** -0.00478*** -0.00536***
Telephones (0.00117) (0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00128)
t 0.380*** 0.406*** 0.395*** 0.414*** 0.395*** 0.411*** 0.418*** 0.430***
(0.0302) (0.0284) (0.0306) (0.0286) (0.0306) (0.0284) (0.0333) (0.0308)
Constant -10.05*** -10.89*** -9.814*** -10.58*** -9.850*** -10.60*** -10.60*** -11.35***
(0.468) (0.438) (0.469) (0.437) (0.470) (0.436) (0.506) (0.471)
Observations 1,142 1142 1,142 1142 1,142 1142 1,142 1142
R-squared 0.830 0.876 0.829 0.877 0.828 0.879 0.824 0.878
(vi) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(i) Regression of ln(yit/(yit
*
-yit)) on institutional variables.
(ii) yit
*
=γiPopulationi 
(iii) In the first specification, γ is constant and set equal to 205. In the following three specifications γ it is a predicted value based on the 
results of regressions of the number of Internet users in 2009 on various explanatory variables for a subsample of countries that have 
achieved a high level of Internet penetration.
(iv) Regional dummies included in all regressions.
Table 6 (cont.): Institutional variables and rates of Internet use
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
(v) Robust standard errors in parentheses
Notes:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH
GDPpc -5.61e-05** 4.24e-06** -7.04e-05** 5.82e-06*** -7.35e-05** 6.55e-06*** -8.76e-05*** 7.39e-06***
(2.80e-05) (1.73e-06) (2.95e-05) (1.87e-06) (2.95e-05) (1.86e-06) (2.76e-05) (1.77e-06)
Low -3.133* 0.241* -3.313** 0.260* -3.250** 0.254* -3.335** 0.254*
Literacy (1.632) (0.139) (1.609) (0.137) (1.609) (0.137) (1.611) (0.137)
Medium Low -1.926** 0.0795 -2.021** 0.0906* -1.977** 0.0863 -2.076*** 0.0905*
Literacy (0.805) (0.0552) (0.797) (0.0548) (0.797) (0.0547) (0.793) (0.0541)
Medium -0.561 0.0388 -0.655 0.0491 -0.622 0.0457 -0.690 0.0476
Literacy (0.627) (0.0414) (0.626) (0.0415) (0.625) (0.0414) (0.631) (0.0417)
Medium High -0.0657 -0.0227 -0.151 -0.0139 -0.138 -0.0155 -0.191 -0.0139
Literacy (0.444) (0.0299) (0.444) (0.0301) (0.444) (0.0301) (0.440) (0.0296)
Services 0.0305 -0.000946 0.0268 -0.000621 0.0274 -0.000666 0.0299 -0.000438
(0.0195) (0.00120) (0.0196) (0.00121) (0.0196) (0.00121) (0.0195) (0.00120)
Agriculture -0.0739*** 0.00277** -0.0688*** 0.00235* -0.0713*** 0.00262* -0.0905*** 0.00250*
(0.0206) (0.00135) (0.0207) (0.00136) (0.0206) (0.00136) (0.0205) (0.00135)
Fixed 0.133*** -0.00532*** 0.131*** -0.00503*** 0.132*** -0.00519*** 0.132*** -0.00530***
Telephones (0.0197) (0.00123) (0.0204) (0.00131) (0.0203) (0.00129) (0.0194) (0.00123)
t 0.386*** 0.372*** 0.369*** 0.354***
(0.0811) (0.0817) (0.0818) (0.0803)
Constant -10.26*** -9.780*** -9.808*** -9.812***
(1.322) (1.325) (1.327) (1.307)
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142
R-squared 0.880 0.878 0.881 0.899
(v) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(vi) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(i) Regression of ln(yit/(yit
*
-yit)) on economic variables.
(ii) yit
*
=γiPopulationi 
(iii) In the first specification, γ is constant and set equal to 205. In the following three specifications γ it is a predicted value based on the 
results of regressions of the number of Internet users in 2009 on various explanatory variables for a subsample of countries that have 
achieved a high level of Internet penetration.
(iv) Regional dummies included in all regressions.
Table 7: Economic variables and rates of Internet use
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
Notes:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH
Rugged -0.0869 0.00447 -0.0474 0.000537 -0.0517 0.00101 -0.0749 0.00825
(0.149) (0.00951) (0.150) (0.00964) (0.150) (0.00962) (0.154) (0.0101)
Pop Density -0.000131 2.07e-06 -0.000195 9.75e-06 -0.000188 9.09e-06 -0.000223 1.49e-05
(0.000151) (9.98e-06) (0.000148) (1.00e-05) (0.000148) (1.01e-05) (0.000153) (1.06e-05)
Rural Pop -0.0143 0.000214 -0.0130 0.000244 -0.0134 0.000319 -0.0146 0.000495
(0.0101) (0.000644) (0.0102) (0.000659) (0.0102) (0.000657) (0.0101) (0.000651)
Democratic 0.169 -0.00531 0.0994 -0.00291 0.114 -0.00342 0.175 -0.0112
(0.658) (0.0264) (0.668) (0.0270) (0.666) (0.0269) (0.659) (0.0264)
Autocratic -0.723 0.0194 -0.697 0.0175 -0.707 0.0180 -0.690 0.0195
(0.997) (0.0401) (1.005) (0.0406) (1.003) (0.0405) (1.005) (0.0405)
Regulatory 0.840*** -0.0339** 0.808*** -0.0285 0.837*** -0.0317* 0.837*** -0.0340**
Quality (0.258) (0.0169) (0.261) (0.0174) (0.260) (0.0173) (0.261) (0.0173)
DSL 0.173 -0.0184 0.268 -0.0280 0.241 -0.0252 0.200 -0.0216
Monopoly (0.514) (0.0342) (0.516) (0.0345) (0.515) (0.0344) (0.516) (0.0344)
DSL -0.625 0.00469 -0.497 -0.00841 -0.527 -0.00543 -0.502 -0.00469
Partial Comp (0.564) (0.0366) (0.565) (0.0371) (0.566) (0.0371) (0.568) (0.0372)
Int. Services -0.978 0.0886** -1.005 0.0919** -0.975 0.0884** -0.923 0.0832*
Monopoly (0.618) (0.0438) (0.620) (0.0441) (0.619) (0.0440) (0.622) (0.0441)
Int. Services 0.888 -0.0289 0.826 -0.0224 0.870 -0.0266 0.887 -0.0284
Partial Comp (0.564) (0.0372) (0.564) (0.0375) (0.565) (0.0376) (0.564) (0.0375)
Common Law -0.505 0.0699*** -0.551 0.0726*** -0.526 0.0696*** -0.436 0.0620**
(0.381) (0.0245) (0.385) (0.0251) (0.385) (0.0251) (0.385) (0.0250)
GDPpc -2.27e-05 1.09e-06 -3.57e-05 2.48e-06 -4.11e-05 3.43e-06* -5.94e-05** 4.40e-06**
(2.71e-05) (1.75e-06) (2.88e-05) (1.90e-06) (2.96e-05) (1.98e-06) (2.75e-05) (1.84e-06)
Low -4.078*** 0.308** -4.168*** 0.315** -4.125*** 0.310** -4.122*** 0.318**
Literacy (1.528) (0.127) (1.528) (0.127) (1.528) (0.127) (1.571) (0.131)
Medium Low -1.970** 0.0965* -2.078*** 0.107** -2.038*** 0.103* -2.160*** 0.116**
Literacy (0.776) (0.0539) (0.776) (0.0541) (0.777) (0.0541) (0.774) (0.0538)
Table 8: Rates of Internet use and all explanatory variables
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH LOCATION GROWTH
Medium -0.929 0.0666 -0.994 0.0727* -0.968 0.0702* -1.004 0.0769*
Literacy (0.626) (0.0414) (0.626) (0.0418) (0.626) (0.0418) (0.630) (0.0418)
Medium High -0.194 -0.0129 -0.209 -0.0114 -0.199 -0.0126 -0.290 -0.00377
Literacy (0.403) (0.0271) (0.405) (0.0275) (0.406) (0.0274) (0.403) (0.0271)
Services 0.0170 -0.000661 0.0141 -0.000446 0.0139 -0.000411 0.0150 -2.32e-06
(0.0190) (0.00118) (0.0191) (0.00119) (0.0191) (0.00120) (0.0190) (0.00119)
Agriculture -0.0479** 0.00189 -0.0468** 0.00182 -0.0481** 0.00194 -0.0646*** 0.00119
(0.0232) (0.00153) (0.0232) (0.00155) (0.0232) (0.00155) (0.0233) (0.00154)
Fixed 0.0890*** -0.00285** 0.0889*** -0.00265** 0.0898*** -0.00283** 0.0938*** -0.00304**
Telephones (0.0183) (0.00115) (0.0192) (0.00124) (0.0193) (0.00124) (0.0186) (0.00119)
t 0.300*** 0.296*** 0.286*** 0.259***
(0.0837) (0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0847)
Constant -8.175*** -7.829*** -7.808*** -7.759***
(1.361) (1.376) (1.378) (1.368)
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142
R-squared 0.899 0.896 0.897 0.911
Notes:
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
Table 8 (cont.): Rates of Internet use and all explanatory variables
(v) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(vi) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(i) Regression of ln(yit/(yit
*
-yit)) on all explanatory variables.
(ii) yit
*
=γiPopulationi 
(iii) In the first specification, γ is constant and set equal to 205. In the following three specifications γ it is a predicted value based on the 
results of regressions of the number of Internet users in 2009 on various explanatory variables for a subsample of countries that have 
achieved a high level of Internet penetration.
(iv) Regional dummies included in all regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOCATION
GDPpc 0.000252*** -9.39e-05*** 0.000232*** -0.000110*** 0.000230*** -0.000112*** 0.000237*** -0.000142***
(2.54e-05) (2.97e-05) (2.59e-05) (3.13e-05) (2.56e-05) (3.12e-05) (2.65e-05) (3.08e-05)
Fixed 0.206*** 0.202*** 0.203*** 0.225***
Telephones (0.0198) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0209)
GROWTH
GDPpc -9.19e-06*** 6.69e-06*** -6.93e-06*** 8.41e-06*** -6.51e-06*** 9.04e-06*** -6.03e-06*** 1.11e-05***
(1.62e-06) (1.86e-06) (1.69e-06) (2.01e-06) (1.66e-06) (2.00e-06) (1.72e-06) (1.99e-06)
Fixed -0.00857*** -0.00810*** -0.00832*** -0.00915***
Telephones (0.00128) (0.00134) (0.00132) (0.00137)
t 0.474*** 0.478*** 0.472*** 0.476*** 0.471*** 0.475*** 0.482*** 0.487***
(0.0236) (0.0213) (0.0235) (0.0211) (0.0235) (0.0211) (0.0260) (0.0233)
Constant -11.94*** -12.11*** -11.55*** -11.72*** -11.59*** -11.76*** -12.30*** -12.48***
(0.374) (0.334) (0.371) (0.331) (0.371) (0.331) (0.412) (0.367)
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142
R-squared 0.789 0.846 0.793 0.848 0.798 0.851 0.792 0.849
(v) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(vi) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(i) Regression of ln(yit/(yit
*
-yit)) on GDP p.c. and Fixed Telephone Lines per 100 people.
(ii) yit
*
=γiPopulationi 
(iii) In the first specification, γ is constant and set equal to 205. In the following three specifications γ it is a predicted value based on the 
results of regressions of the number of Internet users in 2009 on various explanatory variables for a subsample of countries that have 
achieved a high level of Internet penetration.
(iv) Regional dummies included in all regressions.
Table 9: Rates of Internet use and GDP p.c.
γ=205 predicted γ1 predicted γ2 predicted γ3
Notes:
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